

PLOTINUS

The Enneads

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3.8 (30)

On Nature, Contemplation, and the One

INTRODUCTION

This treatise forms part of a longer work [‘the *Grossschrift*’] (which includes 5.8, 5.5, and 2.9) which Porphyry split up in his edition. It is his most ambitious discussion of the vital role of contemplation and of all its different forms and intensities at every level of reality. Although he is primarily concerned with the structure of reality itself, the activity of individual human contemplation surfaces frequently throughout.

SUMMARY

- §1. Let us suppose in a playful way that all things contemplate.
- §2. At the lowest level nature, like a craftsman, works on matter by means of its contemplation and the expressed principle.
- §3. Nature’s contemplation produces without being itself affected.
- §4. Nature would say that its product flows from its contemplation, just as it flowed from its producer. Its contemplation is only an image of a higher form of contemplation and its product a by-product.
- §5. Contemplation at the level of soul.
- §6. Action also leads to contemplation.
- §7. Contemplation at the level of Being produces active contemplative expressed principles which give form at every level. Failure is due to the progressive weakening of contemplation.
- §8. In Intellect contemplation is identical with the object of contemplation. It is the primary life and all life at every level is contemplative.

Enneads 3.8: Introduction

- §9. Intellect is not the first. The One, the Good, is beyond it.
We can have access even to this.
- §10. The One is not everything but is the productive power and source of everything.
- §11. Intellect needs the Good, but the Good is not in need of anything.

3.8 (30)

On Nature, Contemplation, and the One

§3.8.1. If, before attempting to be serious, we were actually to begin by playing and say that all things aim at contemplation and look to this goal, not only rational but also non-rational animals¹ and nature in
5 plants and the earth which produces them, and that all things achieve it as far as they can in their natural state, but contemplate and achieve it in different ways, and some in a genuine manner, others by acquiring an imitation and image of it, would anyone put up with the oddity of the statement?

In fact, when the issue has been raised amongst ourselves, there will be no harm in playing with what is ours.

10 Are we, too, then contemplating right now when we are playing?

In fact, both we and all who play are contemplating or at least desire this when we are playing. And, as it happens, whether it is a child or a man that plays or is serious, he is going to be playing or he is being
15 serious for the sake of contemplation; and every action is going to involve a serious tendency to contemplation; compulsory action² in a stronger manner,³ drawing contemplation towards externals, but so-called voluntary action less so while still originating in a desire for contemplation. But we will deal with this later.⁴

20 For now, let us ask about earth itself and trees and plants in general what contemplation is in their case, how we will trace back what is produced or generated from the earth to the activity of contemplation, and how nature, which they⁵ say is without a mental image and reason, both possesses contemplation within itself and produces what it produces through contemplation which it does not have and yet somehow does have.⁶

§3.8.2. It is, I think, clear to everyone that there is no question here of hands or feet or of any instrument, whether acquired from outside or

¹ See Ar., *EN* 10.2.1172b10, on the view of Eudoxus. ² Deleting καὶ with Theiler.

³ Comma inserted here with Theiler. ⁴ Cf. *infra* 5 6.

⁵ See *SVF* 2.1016 (= Sext. Emp., *M.* 9.111 115), 2.458 (= Philo, *Leg. alleg.* 2.22).

⁶ Reading καὶ πῶς ('somehow') with Kirchhoff.

built in, but of matter for it [nature] to work on and to which it applies form. And one must also exclude levering from natural production; for what kind of pushing or leverage produces different colours of all shades and shapes? Not even the fashioners of wax models⁷ can produce colours without bringing them in to what they are fashioning from elsewhere; and people looked at them and actually thought that nature's creation is similar.

Those, however, who are making this comparison ought to have considered that just as in the case of those who practise such crafts something must remain in them in accordance with which, while still remaining in them, they produce their artefacts by means of their hands, they must also go back to a similar thing in nature and understand that here, too, all the power that produces not by means of hands must remain and remain entire. For there is, indeed, no need for it [power] to have some parts that remain and others that are in motion, for matter is what is in motion, but nothing in power is in motion; otherwise, it [power] will not be the prime mover, nor will nature be this [the prime mover], but that which is unmoved in the whole [of nature].

Someone might indeed say that the expressed principle is unmoved, whereas nature itself is different from the expressed principle and is in motion. But if they go on to say that nature is entirely in motion, the expressed principle, too, will be in motion. But if any part of nature is unmoved, this would, in fact, be the expressed principle.⁸ For nature must be a form and not composed of matter and form;⁹ for what need does it have of warm or cold matter?

In fact, the matter which underlies and is worked on comes bringing this, or rather the matter, though not possessing quality, becomes such, when subject to an expressed principle. For it is not fire that has to approach for matter to become fire, but an expressed principle.

This is no minor sign that in animals and in plants expressed principles are what produces and that nature is an expressed principle, which makes another expressed principle, its production, which in turn gives something to the substrate while it itself remains. And so the final expressed principle, which is in the visible shape,¹⁰ is at this stage a corpse and is unable to make another expressed principle, but the one which possesses life, as the brother of the one which made the shape and itself having the identical power, produces something in what has come to be.¹¹

⁷ See Pl., *Tim.* 74C6. ⁸ Cf. 3.2.4.12 16. ⁹ See Ar., *Phys.* 2.1.193b12, 18.

¹⁰ Cf. 5.8.7.12 16; 5.9.6.20 24.

¹¹ Here nature is distinguished from its image, which gives 'shape' to bodies. The 'brother' here probably refers to souls of individual bodies. Cf. 4.3.6; 2.9.18.14 17. On sensible bodies as corpses, cf. 2.4.5.16 18; 3.4.1.7.

§3.8.3. How, then, while the expressed principle produces, that is, produces in this way, could it attain to any kind of contemplation?

In fact, if it produces while remaining, that is, both remaining in itself and an expressed principle, it would itself be contemplation. For action would occur in accordance with an expressed principle being clearly
 5 different from it; but the expressed principle, which accompanies action and looks after it, would not be action.¹² Then, if it is not action but an expressed principle, it is contemplation. And in the case of every expressed principle, the one that is last is derived from contemplation and is contemplation in the sense that it is what has been contemplated, but the one prior to this is all contemplation, though part of it is contemplation in a different way, that is, not as nature but as soul, and
 10 the other part is in nature, that is, is identical to nature.

Does nature itself also really derive from contemplation? Yes, entirely from contemplation. But is it itself [produced] by contemplating itself?

In fact, how else? For it is the result of contemplation and of something that has contemplated. But how does nature have contemplation? It doesn't have it, certainly, from reasoning; by 'from reasoning' I mean
 15 looking over its own contents. Why, then, is this so given that it is a life, an expressed principle, and productive power? Is it because to 'look over' is not yet to possess? But it does possess and it is precisely because it possesses that it also produces.

So for it, being what it is, the act of producing and being something that produces is precisely what it is. But it is contemplation and object of contemplation, since it is an expressed principle. And so by being
 20 contemplation, object of contemplation, and an expressed principle, it also produces insofar as it is these things. Its producing has, therefore, been shown by us to be contemplation. For it is the result of a contemplation that remains, a contemplation which has not done anything else but has produced by being contemplation.¹³

§3.8.4. And if someone were to ask nature why it produces, if it were willing to listen and answer the questioner it would say: 'You should not ask but understand and fall silent yourself, as I am silent and not accus-
 5 tomed to speak. Understand what, then? That what comes to be is my vision, in my silence,¹⁴ an object of contemplation that comes to be by nature, and that since I come to be from this sort of contemplation, it is necessary for me to have a contemplation-loving nature. And my contemplating produces an object of contemplation, just as geometricians

¹² See Ar., *DA* 3.11.434a16 21. ¹³ Cf. 3.2.1.34 45.

¹⁴ Reading ἐμὸν σιωπώσης with HS⁴.

draw lines as they contemplate. But without my drawing, while I contemplate, the lines of bodies come to exist as though falling out of me. And my experience is the same as that of my mother and those who begat me.¹⁵ For they, too, are a result of contemplation and my birth has come about without them doing anything, but since they are greater expressed principles and contemplate themselves, I have come to be.¹⁶

What, then, does this mean? It means that what we call 'nature' is a soul, offspring of a prior soul having a more powerful life, holding contemplation still within itself not directed to what is above, nor even to what is below, but stationary in what it is, in its own stable position, it saw what comes after it by a comprehension of this kind and a sort of self-awareness¹⁷ as far as it can and it no longer searched but has perfected a beautiful and graceful vision.

And if anyone wants to grant it some kind of comprehension or perception, it is not what we call perception and comprehension in other cases, but as if someone were to compare awareness in sleep to the self-awareness of someone awake. For it is at rest in contemplating itself as object of contemplation which has come to it from its abiding in and with itself, and from its being an object of contemplation. And its contemplation is soundless, but more clouded.

For there is another type of contemplation clearer than it in its vision, and nature is an image of this other type. Indeed, for this reason, what is generated by it is also completely weak because a contemplation that is weak makes a weak object of contemplation. Human beings, too, when they are weak in contemplation, produce action as a shadow of contemplation and reason. For their faculty of contemplation is not adequate for them due to weakness of soul, and being unable to grasp adequately the object of their vision and because of this not being filled [by it], yet still desirous of seeing it, they are carried towards action so that they can see [with their eyes] what they cannot see with their intellect. Whenever they do succeed in producing something, they also want to see it for themselves and others to contemplate and perceive it, whenever their project is realized as far as it can be in action.

Indeed, everywhere we will find that production and action are a weakened form of contemplation or a consequence of contemplation; a weakness where a person has nothing in mind beyond what has been made, a consequence where he has something prior to this to

¹⁵ 'Mother' refers to the soul of the cosmos and the 'begetters' refers to the expressed principles in soul derived from Forms in Intellect.

¹⁶ On the self contemplation of Forms, cf. 3.9.6; 5.1.4.

¹⁷ Reading in lines 19 20 καὶ [οἶον συναισθήσει] τῇ συνέσει ταύτῃ καὶ <οἶον> συναισθήσει with HS⁴.

contemplate which is superior to what has been produced. For why
 45 if he can contemplate what is genuine as their first choice, if he can contemplate what is genuine? And less intelligent children are also evidence of this; not being capable of study and theory, they turn to crafts and manual work.

§3.8.5. But now that, in our discussion of nature, we have said in what
 way generation is contemplation, let us go to the soul before this¹⁸ and
 say how its contemplation, its love of learning, its inquisitive nature,¹⁹
 5 the birth pangs from the things it recognized and its completeness have produced it, so that when it has become entirely an object of contemplation, it produces another object of contemplation. It is like the way in which craft produces; when each craft is complete it produces a kind of little craft in a toy which possesses a reflection of everything. But in other respects these visions and objects of contemplation are like things dim and unable to help themselves.

10 So the first part of soul²⁰ which is above and is always being filled and illuminated by what is above remains in the intelligible world, while the other part, by means of the first participation in it as participant, goes forth²¹ in participation.²² For life always goes forth from life, since activity reaches everywhere and is not absent from anywhere. Yet as it
 15 goes forth, it allows the prior part to remain where it left it; for if it were to abandon its prior part, it would no longer be everywhere but only at the last point which it reached. But what goes forth is not equivalent to what has remained.

If, then, it must be everywhere and there must be nowhere where its
 activity is not present and the prior must be different from the posterior,
 20 and if activity derives from contemplation or action – and action did not yet exist for it cannot precede contemplation – it is necessary that one activity is weaker than another, but all of it is contemplation. And so the action which appears to be in accordance with contemplation is the weakest contemplation; for what is produced must always be of the same
 25 kind [as what produces it], but weaker because it becomes attenuated²³ as it descends. Indeed, everything goes forth without sound because there is no need of any visible and externally originating contemplation or action, while both the soul which contemplates and that which contemplates in the way described, inasmuch as it does so externally

¹⁸ This is the soul of the cosmos. ¹⁹ See Pl., *Phdr.* 251B5f.

²⁰ Deleting τὸ λογιστικὸν with HS⁴, following Kirchhoff, which may be a gloss.

²¹ Reading μεταλαμβάνον <πρόεισι> with HS⁴.

²² The distinction between the soul of the cosmos and nature is analogous to the distinction between the undescended and descended parts of the intellect. Cf. 3.2.2.18–33.

²³ See Pl., *Rep.* 497B4, of a seed.

and not in the same way as what went before it, produces what comes after it and contemplation produces contemplation. For contemplation does not have a limit nor does the object of contemplation. 30

This is why [soul contemplates]; in fact, this is why it is everywhere. For where is it not present since it is also identical in every soul? For it is not circumscribed by magnitude. Yet it is not present in the same way in everything with the result that it is not even present in every part of soul in the same way. For this reason, the charioteer²⁴ gives the horses something of what he saw, while it is obvious that the horses which have taken it would have a desire for what they saw. For they did not receive all of it. But if they are to act on this desire, they are acting for the sake of what they desire. And that was an object of contemplation and contemplation. 35

§3.8.6. Action, therefore, is for the sake of contemplation and for an object of contemplation. And so contemplation is the goal even for those who are acting, and what they are unable to obtain in a straight line, in a way, they seek to grasp by a circuitous route. For whenever they succeed in achieving the object of their desire, which they want to come to be, not because they want to be ignorant of it, but rather to know and see it present in their soul; in this case, it is clear that it lies there as something to be contemplated. And that is also because they act for the sake of a good. And they do this not so that it should be outside them nor that they should not possess it, but so that they should possess the good that comes from action. 5

Where is this? In the soul. Action, then, turns back again to contemplation. For what else could that be which someone receives in his soul, which is itself an expressed principle, than a silent expressed principle? And all the more silent the more [the soul possesses it within]. For then it holds its peace and seeks nothing since it has been filled. And contemplation in such a person lies within because he is confident in its possession. And as the confidence becomes clearer, the contemplation, too, becomes stiller, which enables the soul to bring the contemplation into unity. And that which knows insofar as it knows – for now we must be serious²⁵ – comes into unity with what is known.²⁶ 10

For if they are two, the knower will be one thing and the known another, so that they lie side by side, in a way, and this pair is not yet reconciled by the soul, just like expressed principles which although present in the soul produce nothing. For this reason, the expressed principle must not remain external but be unified with the soul of the learner until he discovers what is his own. 15 20

²⁴ See Pl., *Phdr.* 247D1 Eo6.

²⁵ Cf. *supra* I.1ff.

²⁶ Cf. I.3.4.18.

25 The soul, then, when it has become reconciled to [the known] and disposed [in accordance with an expressed principle], still proceeds to bring it forth and set it to the fore – for it did not possess it in a primary way – and to learn it. And by bringing it forth it becomes, in a way, different from it and, when it reasons, looks upon it as being other than itself. And yet soul was itself an expressed principle and a sort of intellect, but one that is looking at another; for it is not full, but lacking compared with its prior. It, too, however, sees in stillness what it brings forth. For it no longer brings forth what it has brought forth well, but by its very deficiency brings forth for investigation and learns what it has.

30 But in active persons, the soul fits what it has to the external. And by its greater possession, it is stiller than nature, and by its being fuller it is more contemplative, but because it does not possess perfectly, it desires to have to a greater degree the knowledge of what it has contemplated and the contemplation which is the result of the investigation of it. And when the soul abandons itself and comes into the company of other things, and next is returning once again, it sees with the part which it left behind; but the soul which remains stationary in itself does this less. For this reason, the virtuous person has already completed reasoning when he reveals what is within him to another, but in relation to himself he is vision.²⁷ For this person is already directed towards the One and to stillness not only amongst externals, but also with respect to himself and everything internal.

5 §3.8.7. That everything, then, comes from contemplation and is contemplation, both the Beings that truly are and those things that come from them when they contemplate and which are themselves objects of contemplation, some for sense-perception, others for knowing or belief; that actions, too, have their goal in knowing and their desire is for knowing and that what is produced from contemplation has its goal in a further form and object of contemplation; that, in general, each thing is an imitation of what produced it and produces [further] objects of contemplation and forms, and the beings that come to exist, being imitations of Beings, reveal that their producers have as their goal not acts of production and actions, but the finished product in order to contemplate it; that both acts of discursive reason and even before them acts of sense-perception, whose aim is to know, want to look upon this; and that before these, nature produces the object of contemplation and an expressed principle in itself, perfecting another expressed principle, all this is, I think, clear, some of it is self-evident, and some again our account has brought back to mind.

²⁷ Cf. 4.4.12.5 18.

This, then, too, is clear, namely, that when the primary Beings are engaged in contemplation everything else, too, of necessity desires this, if indeed for all things their starting point is their goal.²⁸ Another reason is as follows: whenever living beings generate, the expressed principles that are within them cause the motion, and this is an activity of contemplation and the birth pain of producing many forms and objects of contemplation, and filling everything with expressed principles and a sort of continuous contemplation. For to produce is to make a form exist and this means to fill everything with contemplation. And the failures, both in what comes to be and in actions, are due to the divergence of those that contemplate from the object of contemplation. And the bad craftsman is like someone who produces ugly forms. Lovers, too, are among those who see and hasten on towards a form. 20

§3.8.8. This is our account of the matter. But when contemplation ascends from nature to Soul and from Soul to Intellect, the acts of contemplation are even more fully appropriated by, that is, more unified with, the contemplators.²⁹ In the case of the virtuous person's soul, that which is known approaches becoming identical with the substrate which contemplates, inasmuch as it hastens to Intellect. In Intellect, it is clear that the two are already one not by appropriation, as in the case of the best soul, but in Substantiality because 'thinking and Being are identical'.³⁰ For there is no longer one thing and another; if there were, there would then be yet another again, which would no longer be one thing and another. It must be, then, that Intellect comprises both as really one. 5 10

But this is a contemplation that is alive, not an object of contemplation like that in another.³¹ What is in another is living on account of that, but not living for itself. If, then, an object of contemplation or thought is to be alive, it must be a life itself, not the life of the faculties of growth and of sense-perception or of the rest of soul. For other lives are also somehow acts of intellection; but one kind of intellection is that of the faculty of growth, another belongs to the faculty of sense-perception, and another to the soul. How are they instances of intellection? Because they are expressed principles. And every life is intellection of a sort, but one kind more obscure than another, just as life is, too. 15

This life, however, is more clear and is the primary Life³² and primary Intellect, and these are one. And so the first life is intellection

²⁸ See Pl., *Lg.* 715E8, which Plotinus here understands as a reference to the One.

²⁹ Cf. 5.3.5.26 28, 41 48; 5.9.5.1 7.

³⁰ Cf. 1.4.10.6; 5.1.8.17 18; 5.6.6.22 23; 5.9.5.29 30; 6.7.4.18. See Parmenides, fr. 28 B 3 DK.

³¹ Cf. 1.4.3.33 40; 3.7.3.11 23. ³² See Ar., *Meta.* 12.7.1072b26 30.

20 and the second life is a second kind of intellection, and the last life is a final form of intellection. And so all life is of this kind and is intellection. People might perhaps say that there are different kinds of life, though they do not say these are different kinds of intellection, but rather that some are instances of intellection, others not intellection at
 25 all, doing this because they do not investigate what life in general is. But we really must point out the following, that our argument demonstrates once again that all beings are a by-product of contemplation. So, if the truest life is life with intellection, and this is identical with the truest intellection, then the truest intellection is alive, and contemplation and the object of the highest kind of contemplation are alive and are life, and the two are together one.

30 If, then, these two are one, how can this one also be many?³³

In fact, it is because it does not contemplate what is one. Since even when it contemplates the One, it does so not as one. If this were not so, it would not become Intellect. But beginning as one, it did not remain as it began, but, becoming many without noticing it, in a way ‘weighed down’³⁴ it unfolded itself in its wish to have everything – how much
 35 better it would have been for it not to want this, for it became second – as a circle comes to be by deploying itself; shape, plane, circumference, centre, radii, some parts above, others below. Hence, the starting points are better, the end points inferior. For the goal is not of the same kind as the origin-and-goal nor again the origin-and-goal the same as the origin alone.

And, to express it differently, Intellect is not the intellect of one particular thing, but Intellect as a whole. And being Intellect as a whole, it is the Intellect of everything. And so since it is all Beings and belongs to all Beings even its part must possess all Beings. If this is
 45 not so, it will have some part that is not Intellect and it will be composed from non-intellec[t]s; and it will be a heap gathered up waiting to become an intellect out of all things. For this reason, it is unlimited in this way and, if anything comes from it, there is no diminution, neither of that which comes from it, because it, too, is everything, nor of that from which it comes, because it was not a composite formed from parts.

§3.8.9. This, then, is what Intellect is like; for this reason, it is not the first, but there must be what is ‘beyond’³⁵ it – the previous arguments also lead up to this – first, because a multiplicity comes after unity. And while Intellect is Number,³⁶ the real One is the principle of Number
 5 and Number of this kind. And this Intellect is also at the same time

³³ Cf. 4.8.3.10; 5.1.8.26; 5.3.15.10 22; 5.4.1.20 21; 6.7.14.1 18, etc.

³⁴ See Pl., *Symp.* 203B7. ³⁵ See Pl., *Rep.* 509B9. ³⁶ Cf. 5.1.5.6 17; 5.5.5.2 14.

intelligible,³⁷ so that at the same time there are two. But if there are two, we must grasp what is before the two. What, then, is it? Is it just Intellect on its own? But the intelligible is yoked to every intellect; so if the intelligible is not to be yoked with it, Intellect will not exist either. If, then, it is not Intellect, but shuns duality, what is before these two transcends Intellect.

10

Why, then, couldn't it be the intelligible?

In fact, it is because that which is intelligible, too, is yoked to Intellect. Then, if it is to be neither Intellect nor intelligible, what could it be? We will say that it is that from which comes Intellect and the intelligible that is with it. What, then, is this and what sort of thing are we to imagine it to be? For it is certainly going to be either something that thinks or something that is without thought. If, then, it is thinking, it will be Intellect, but if it is without thought it will be ignorant even of itself. What, then, is dignified in that?³⁸ For if we were to say that it is the Good and is the most simple thing, we will still not be saying anything clear and distinct, even if we are saying what is true, so long as we do not possess a firm foundation for our discursive thinking when we speak.

15

For, again, if knowledge of other things comes about by means of intellect and it is by intellect that we are able to know Intellect, with what sort of concentrated apprehension will that be seized which transcends the nature of Intellect? We shall say to the person to whom we must make clear how this is possible that it is by means of that in us which is the same as it.³⁹ For there is something of it even within us.⁴⁰

20

In fact, there is nowhere where it is not, for those able to partake of it.⁴¹ For wherever you place that which is able to possess what is omnipresent, it is from there that you possess it. Just as when a voice fills an empty space or human beings, too, as well as the space, in whatever part of the empty space you place your ear you will receive the voice as a whole and yet not all of it.

25

What, then, is it that we receive when we apply our intellect?

30

In fact, the intellect must, in a way, retreat to what is behind it and somehow let go of itself to what is behind it, since it looks both ways, and in the intelligible world,⁴² if it wants to see the One, it must be not entirely intellect. For Intellect is itself the primary Life since it is activity engaged in its progression through everything, not a progression which is progressing but one which has progressed. If, then, it is indeed both Life and is progression and possesses everything precisely and not in

35

³⁷ See Ar., *DA* 3.4.430a2 3.

³⁸ See Pl., *Soph.* 249A1; Ar., *Meta.* 12.9.1074b17 18.

³⁹ Cf. 6.9.4.26 28, 11.30 32.

⁴⁰ Cf. 5.1.11.6 7.

⁴¹ Reading αὐτοῦ. τὸ with HS⁴.

⁴² Reading κἀκεῖ[να] with Armstrong.

a general way – for it would then possess them imperfectly and in an inarticulate way – it must itself come from something else which is no longer in progression, but is the principle of progression, the principle of Life, the principle of Intellect and of all things. For all things are not
 40 a principle, but all things are from a principle. And this is no more all things, nor any of them, to enable it to generate all things and not be a multiplicity, but the principle of multiplicity. For that which generates is everywhere simpler than that which is generated.

If, then, this generated Intellect, it must be simpler than Intellect.
 45 And if someone were to suppose that the One itself is everything, either it will be each one of everything one by one or all together. Now, if it is all gathered together, it will be subsequent to everything. But if it is prior to everything, everything will be other than it and it will be other than everything. And if it is itself and everything at the same time, it will
 50 not be a principle. It must, however, be a principle and be prior to everything so that everything can exist after it. And if it is each one of all things separately, first any one will be identical with any other and next, all will be together and nothing will be distinct. And for this reason, it is none of all things, but prior to all things.⁴³

§3.8.10. What indeed is it? It is the productive power of all things.⁴⁴ If it did not exist, neither would all things, nor would Intellect be the primary total Life. And that which is beyond Life is cause of Life.⁴⁵ For the activity of life which is all things is not primary, but is poured forth as
 5 though from a spring. Think of a spring which has no other source, but gives all of itself to rivers while not exhausting itself in the rivers but quietly remaining itself, while the streams which go forth from it are still all together before they flow their separate ways, yet at this point they already each know as individual rivers in what direction they will release
 10 their waters; or of life in a huge plant passing through its entirety while the source remains as though seated in the root and is not scattered around it all. So, this source presents life in its total multiplicity to the plant, but itself remains non-many. And this is no great wonder.

The wonder is, rather, how the multiplicity of life has come from
 15 what is not a multiplicity and how the multiplicity would not exist unless what preceded the multiplicity was a thing that was not a multiplicity. For the source is not divided into the whole, since if it had been so divided it would have destroyed the whole as well; nor would the whole continue to exist if the source did not continue to remain in itself and
 20 different.⁴⁶ For this reason, in all cases [of multiplicity], the ascent is to

⁴³ Cf. 3.9.4.3 9; 5.2.1.1 2; 5.3.11.14 21, 13.2 3; 5.4.2.39 42; 5.5.13.33 36.

⁴⁴ Cf. 5.1.7.9 10; 5.3.15.32 35; 5.4.1.36, 2.38; 6.9.5.36. See *Pl., Rep.* 509B9 10.

⁴⁵ 1.6.7.11 12; 5.3.16.35 38; 6.7.18.16 31. ⁴⁶ Cf. 5.2.2.13 17.

a one. And there is some one in each case to which you will trace it back; and this whole you will trace back to a one before it, not an absolute one, until you come to the absolute One; and this no longer [goes back] to another one.

But if you take the one of the plant, and this is also its source which remains, the one of a living being, the one of the soul, and the one of the universe, you take in each case the most powerful and valued thing. But if you take the One belonging to true Beings, their ‘principle and source’⁴⁷ and power, are we to lose faith and suppose it to be nothing? 25

In fact, it is none⁴⁸ of the things whose source it is, yet is the sort of thing which, because nothing can be predicated of it, not Existence, not Substantiality, not Life, is a thing beyond them. And if you grasp it after removing Existence from it, you will be amazed. Cast yourself towards it and encounter it taking rest within it; unite your thought with it more and more by knowing it through immediate contact with it and by beholding its greatness through what comes after it and is caused by it. 30

§3.8.11. And you can consider it further in the following way. Since Intellect is a kind of sight and a sight that is seeing, it will be [like] a potency which is actualized. So, there will be its matter and its form, though matter here is intelligible. Besides, actual seeing, too, is twofold; before seeing it was one; then, the one became two and the two one. 5
The completion and, in a way, perfecting of sight, then, comes from the sensible, but for the sight of Intellect it is the Good which completes it; for if Intellect was the Good, what need would it have to see or be active at all?

For other things have their activity with respect to and for the sake of the Good, whereas the Good has no need of anything. And so it has nothing but itself. For this reason, when you have uttered ‘the Good’, don’t make any mental additions. For if you add anything, you will make that to which you have added something deficient.⁴⁹ For this reason, don’t, then, even add thinking so as not to make it into something else and make it two, Intellect and Good. For while Intellect needs the Good, the Good does not need Intellect. Hence, even when it acquires the Good it becomes Good-like⁵⁰ and is perfected by the Good when the form which comes upon it from the Good makes it Good-like. One should conceive of the archetype as being similar by forming an idea of its true archetype from the trace which comes upon Intellect. 10
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The Good has bestowed its trace upon Intellect to have by seeing it, so that whereas in Intellect there is desire and it both desires and attains

⁴⁷ See Pl., *Phdr.* 245C9.

⁴⁸ Omitting the τὸ in 1.28 with Ficino, Theiler, and Kalligas.

⁴⁹ Cf. 5.3.16.5 16; 6.7.41.14 17. ⁵⁰ See Pl., *Rep.* 509A3.

25 forever, the Good neither desires – what would it desire? – nor attains,
for it did not even desire. So, it isn't even Intellect. For in Intellect there
is desire and convergence with its form.

Indeed, since Intellect is beautiful and the most beautiful of all, and
lies in pure light and a 'pure ray of light'⁵¹ and embraces the nature of
30 Being, whose shadow and image is also seen in this beautiful universe of
ours, and since it lies in total splendour, because there is nothing non-
intelligible, dark or unmeasured in it, living a blessed life, awe takes hold
of the one who sees it and who, plunging into it in the way he should,
becomes one with it. And just as someone who looks up to heaven, as he
35 sees the brilliance of the stars, certainly thinks of their creator and seeks
it, so, too, when someone who has contemplated the intelligible world,
looked into it, and also marvelled at its creator, therefore must also
enquire what it was that brought such a thing into existence or how,
a creator who has begotten such a child as Intellect, a beautiful boy, who
derived his fullness from it.⁵²

40 For surely there is no way in which the Good can be either Intellect
or fullness, but is prior to Intellect and fullness. For Intellect and full-
ness are after it, since they have need of it to be filled and to complete
their thought. And they are close to what has no needs and does not in
any way need to think, but they possess true fullness and intellection,
because they have it primarily. But what is before them neither needs
45 nor possesses anything; otherwise, it would not be the Good.

⁵¹ See Pl., *Phdr.* 250C4.

⁵² A pun on *κόρος* ('boy' and 'fullness'). Cf. 5.1.4.8, 7.33; 5.9.8.8. See Pl., *Crat.* 396B.

4.3–5 (27, 28, and 29)

On Problems of the Soul 1–3

INTRODUCTION

This is one of the major works of Plotinus' 'middle' period, divided (rather curiously) by Porphyry, in the middle of a sentence, at 4.3.32. Following, as it does, immediately upon 3.6 (26), 'On the Impassibility of Things Without Bodies', and not long after 6.4–5 (22–23), 'That Being, One and Identical, is Simultaneously Everywhere Whole', it focuses particularly on the possibility and mode of interaction between an immaterial soul and a material body.

SUMMARY

The treatise consists of a sequence of eight *aporiai*, or 'problems', covering between them all of the outstanding issues relative to the human soul, in particular in its relation to the body, and to the passions and sensations arising from that association, but also its relation to Soul the hypostasis, and to the soul of the universe. It is in fact this last problem with which the treatise opens, and the following problems observe a broadly logical sequence.

After a brief introduction (4.3.1.1–16), the problems are set out as follows. Note that the divisions of the argument do not correspond to the sections of the received text.

1. (4.3. §§1–8): The relation of individual souls to the soul of the cosmos.
2. (4.3. §§9–18): How soul comes to be in body; difference between the soul of the cosmos and other souls in their relations to their bodies.
3. (4.3. §§19–23): The manner of the soul's embodiment.

4. (4.3.§24-4.4.§17): The soul's departure from the body. What does it remember, and how? To what level or levels of being is memory properly appropriate?
5. (4.4.§§18-29): The joint activities of body and soul. What is the proper subject of the emotions and 'raw' sense-perceptions? An excursus (chs. 22-27) on the question of the presence or otherwise of sense-perception in the souls of the earth and of the heavenly bodies.
6. (4.4.§§30-39): The question of the possible effects on us of the activity of the stars and planets; the basis for the efficacy of prayer and magic.
7. (4.4.§§40-45): The workings of cosmic sympathy; the universe as a living organism.

4.3 (27)

On Problems of the Soul I

§4.3.1. Concerning the soul, the right course, I feel, would be to conduct our enquiry in such a way as either to arrive at solutions to the relevant problems, or, if remaining in a state of puzzlement on those points, to regard this at least as a gain, that we know wherein lie the problems. On what subject, after all, would one more justifiably spend one's time in prolonged discussion and investigation than on this one? 5

There are many reasons for this, but particularly that it provides knowledge about both those things of which it is the principle, and those from which it itself derives. In conducting this enquiry indeed we should be obeying the injunction of the god when he enjoins us to 'know ourselves'.¹ Since we want to investigate and find out about the rest of things, it is right that we should investigate what this thing is that does the investigating, longing as we do to lay hold of the desired object of contemplation, which is Intellect. For there is a duality, as we know, in the universal Intellect, and so it is reasonable that in the case of partial instances of it one aspect should take on one role, and another the other.² We must also investigate how it is that we receive the gods; but we shall deal with this when we examine how the soul comes to be in the body.³ 10 15

Now, however, let us turn once again to those who say that our souls are derived from the soul of the universe.⁴ They will perhaps say that to show that our souls are not parts of the soul of the universe it is not sufficient to hold that our souls have the identical reach [into the sensible world] as does the soul of the universe, and that they are equally intellectual; for even if they concede such equality, they would maintain that parts of wholes can be the same in kind.⁵ 20

¹ See Pl., *Prot.* 343B; [?], *Alc.* I 129A2 132C10.

² I.e., as intellection and as intelligibles. ³ Cf. *infra* 9 23.

⁴ The Stoics. See *SVF* 1.495 (= Hermias, *In Gent. Phil.* 14), 2.774 (= D.L., 7.156); Plutarch, *De vir. mor.* 441f.; Philo, *De mut. nom.* 223.

⁵ Cf. 4.9.1.10 21.

25 And they will adduce here the doctrine of Plato,⁶ when he, seeking to support the argument that the universe is ensouled, asserts that, even as our body is a part of the universe, so our soul is a part of the soul of the universe.

30 And they also maintain that the fact that we follow along with the rotation of the universe is something not only asserted but clearly demonstrated,⁷ and also that we take our behaviour and our fortunes from that source, and, coming to be within it as we are, we take our soul from what encompasses us. And even as within us each part of us is a recipient of our soul, so in an analogous way we, as parts of a whole, partake of the soul of the universe as its parts.⁸

35 Furthermore, they will say that the statement ‘all soul cares for what is without soul’⁹ makes the identical point, and shows that Plato does not consider any soul other than the soul of the universe; for this is the soul that is put in charge of all that which has no soul.

§4.3.2. Now, in response to these points, it should first be said that in making them the same in kind¹⁰ – which they do by agreeing that they are in contact with the identical things – they give them the identical common genus and rule them out as parts; rather, it would be more just if they said that they are identical or one, and that each soul is all soul. And by making it one, they cause it to depend on something else, which itself is no longer the soul of this or that body, but belongs to nothing, neither to a cosmos nor to anything else, but which creates that which does belong to the cosmos or to anything that has soul. And indeed it is rightly held that soul should not wholly belong to something, since it does have substantiality, but that there should be Soul which absolutely does not belong to anything, while souls, such as do belong to something, should come to belong to that thing at a given time and accidentally.

10 But perhaps one should try to grasp more clearly what ‘part’ means in the case of things like this. One sense is certainly as in a part of bodies, whether the body is made up of parts that are all of the same kind or

⁶ See Pl., *Phil.* 30A5–6; *Tim.* 30B8. ⁷ See Pl., *Tim.* 90C8–D1.

⁸ The phrase used here is actually ἡ πᾶσα ψυχή. This is equivalent to ἡ ψυχή τοῦ παντός (‘the soul of the universe’, l. 17 above and 4.8.7.27). Other synonymous expressions used are: ἡ ψυχή τοῦ κόσμου (cf. 4.3.2.57), ἡ μία ψυχή καὶ ὅλη (cf. 6.4.4.41), ἡ ψυχή τοῦ ὅλου (cf. 4.3.8.3). The expression ἡ ψυχή ὅλη sometimes refers to the hypostasis Soul (cf. 4.3.6.12). Often, ἡ ψυχή τοῦ κόσμου (‘the soul of the cosmos’) is used equivalently. See Glossary.

⁹ See Pl., *Phdr.* 246B6.

¹⁰ The word is ὁμοειδῆ (cf. 1.22). The point here is not that the parts are members of the identical species but that they are the same in that they are species of the identical genus.

not – that we may leave aside – drawing attention only to this point, that when one talks of a part in the case of things whose parts are all of the same kind, the part is such in respect of its mass, not its form, as in the case, for example, of whiteness; for the whiteness in a part of the milk is not a part of the whiteness in all of the milk, but it is the whiteness of a part, not a part of whiteness; for whiteness is entirely without magnitude and not a quantity. 15

That is how it is in this case. But when we speak of ‘part’ in the case of things that are not bodies, we would be talking about a part as we do in the case of numbers, like two being a part of ten – let us take it that we are talking here of numbers abstractly – or like a part of a circle or a line, or as a theorem is part of a science. But in the case of units and figures, just as with bodies, it is necessary that the whole is diminished by division into parts, and that each of the parts is smaller than the whole; for since they are quantities and their existence is constituted by their being quantities, not Quantity in itself, they necessarily become larger or smaller. 20 25

It is certainly not open to us to talk about a part in this sense in the case of soul. For it is not a thing of quantity in such a way that the whole soul could be a ten and the other, the individual soul, a unit. Many absurd consequences would follow from that, and in particular the fact that the ten would not be a single thing, and each of the units themselves would be a soul, or else the soul will be composed of things which are all without soul; and the fact that the part of the whole soul has been conceded to be of the same kind as it. On the other hand, in the case of a continuum there is no need for the part to be such as the whole is, for example, in the case of a circle or a square, or at least not all the parts are the same in cases where one might take a part, like triangles, which can be parts of triangles, but different ones; but they postulate that all soul is of the same kind. In the case of a line, the part has the characteristic of being a line, but here, too, it differs in magnitude. 30 35 40

In the case of soul, if the difference between the partial soul and the whole were said to be in respect of magnitude, the soul would be a quantity and a body, if it takes its difference, as a soul, from the quantity; but the assumption was that all souls are the same, and are wholes. It is, though, clear that soul is not divided in the manner of magnitudes, nor would they themselves concede that the whole is cut up into parts; for in that case, they will use up the whole soul, and it will become a mere name, unless the soul had once been some original whole, like wine, having been divided into many parts, each part in each jar said to be a part of the whole wine. 45

Is it, then, a part in the sense that a theorem of a given science is said to be a part of the whole science, which itself remains in existence 50

nonetheless, while the division is like a projection or actuality of each part?¹¹ Actually, in a case like this, each part potentially possesses the whole science, but the science is no less a whole. If the same were indeed
 55 to apply to the whole and the others in the case of soul, the whole, of which items of this kind are parts, would not belong to something else, but would be itself by itself; so, it will not even be the soul of the cosmos, but the soul of the cosmos, too, will be one of those which are partial.¹² They will, therefore, all be parts of the one Soul, being of the same kind. But how, then, is the one the soul of the cosmos and the others those of parts of the cosmos?

§4.3.3. Are they perhaps parts in the way that one might say that, in the case of the individual animal, the soul in the finger is a part of the complete soul in the whole animal?

But this account would, in fact, either involve no soul existing outside
 5 body, or postulate all soul as not in body, and so what is said to be the soul of the universe would be outside the body of the cosmos. This we must investigate in due course; for the moment, however, we must examine how it might be described in terms of this scenario. For if the soul of the universe makes itself available to all the partial living beings, and each soul is a part in this way, if it is divided up it would not be making itself available to each one, but if it remains identical it will be
 10 present everywhere as a whole, being one and identical in many living beings at the same time. This would no longer make one soul available as a whole and the other as a part, particularly to things that have the identical power. For where some things have one function and some another, for example, eyes and ears, one must not say that one part of the
 15 soul is present in sight and another in the ears – division of this sort belongs to others¹³ – but rather that the identical thing is present, even if a different power is active in each, for all the powers are in both of them.¹⁴ It is due to the organs being different that there are different
 20 apprehensions, but all of them are of forms, since the soul is capable of being informed by all forms.¹⁵

This is also shown by the fact that everything must converge on one point of reference, but it is because of the organs through which they

¹¹ Cf. 3.9.2.1; 4.9.5.7 9; 5.9.6.3 9.

¹² The distinction here is between the hypostasis Soul and individual souls, including the soul of the cosmos.

¹³ See *SIV* 2.828 (= D.L., 7.110).

¹⁴ The line εἰσι γὰρ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ἅπασι is restored to ll. 17 18 from ll. 13 14 where HS² place it.

¹⁵ The text is probably corrupt here. The sense of the words εἰς εἶδος πάντα δυνάμενον μορφοῦσθαι is rendered loosely.

pass that not all are able to receive everything, and the affections differ in correspondence with the organs, while the judgement is made by the identical judge, in a way, who has grasped the words that have been spoken and the actions that have been performed.¹⁶ 25

But that the soul is one thing everywhere, even in different functions, has been said above.¹⁷ And if our soul were like the acts of sense-perception [of the soul of the universe], it would not be possible in these acts for each of us to think himself,¹⁸ but only the soul of the universe could do this. If, however, thinking belongs to each soul, each would be on its own. But since the soul is rational, and is said to be rational as a whole, what is being called a part will be identical with, and not a part of, the whole. 30

§4.3.4. What is one to say, though, if the soul is one in this way, when someone carries on the investigation from this point, first raising the difficulty of whether it is possible for the soul to be one in this way at the same time in all things, and next, if this can be so when it is in a body, but some other soul is not in a body. For perhaps it will follow that it is all in body, and particularly the soul of the universe; for it is not said to leave the body, as is ours. 5

And yet some say that our soul will leave this particular body, although it will not be outside body entirely.¹⁹ But if it will not²⁰ be entirely outside body, how will the one soul leave the body and the other not, when it is the identical soul? In the case of Intellect which is separated in itself by the sharp differentiation of its parts from each other, even though these are always together – for this kind of substantiality is indivisible – such a problem would not obtain; but in the case of soul which is said to be ‘divisible among bodies’,²¹ that all of them should be some one thing involves many problems. The problem would remain unless someone were to make the one [Soul] stand on its own and not fall into body, and then make all of the souls come from that one, the soul of the universe and the others, being together with each other, in a way, up to a point, and being one by belonging to no one particular body, but linked by their extremes and being together with each other at the top end, and then projecting themselves hither and thither, just as light as soon as it arrives at the earth is actually divided up among physical masses²² and yet is not divided, but is one nonetheless. 10
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¹⁶ See Pl., *Tht.* 184D3–4; Ar., *DA* 2.2.424a18; 3.7.431a1; 3.8.431b26.

¹⁷ Cf. *supra* 9 10. ¹⁸ Cf. 5.3.13.12 14.

¹⁹ Perhaps the Stoics. Also, perhaps some Platonists. The point is made of Eratosthenes and Ptolemy *apud* Iamblichus *apud* Stob., *Ecl.* 1.49.39, but it is something to which Plutarch and Atticus are committed as well.

²⁰ Reading εἰ <οὐ> with Igal and HS⁵. ²¹ See Pl., *Tim.* 35A2–3.

²² Reading ὄγκους, as proposed by HS² in the apparatus.

25 The soul of the universe is always transcendent, because it does not have the property of descending either by its lower part²³ or by turning towards the things here, but ours are not, because they have a part cut out for them here, and because they turn towards what requires care. The one is like the soul in a large plant which manages the plant without trouble and silently, being the lowest part of the soul of the universe, but
30 the lower part of ours is as if worms were to arise in a rotten part of the plant; for this is the status of our ensouled body in the universe.

But our other soul,²⁴ which is of the same kind as the higher part of the soul of the universe, is like some farmer were he to become concerned about the worms in the plant and were he to be afflicted with worries in respect of it; or it is as if one were to say that a person who was healthy and lived with other healthy people was occupied with his own
35 pursuits, either living an active life or devoting himself to contemplation, while someone who was ill and attending to cures for his body was concerned with the body and had come to belong to it.

§4.3.5. But how will one soul still be yours, another this person's and another another's? Will its lower part still belong to an individual, and its higher part not to that individual, but to that which is above? If that is the way it is, there will be Socrates whenever the soul of Socrates is in
5 a body, but he will perish exactly when he comes to be in the best state.²⁵

In fact, no Being perishes, since even in the intelligible world the intellects there, just because they are not divided as bodies are, are not lost into a unity, but each abides in its own identity in differentiation from the rest. So, the same applies to souls, too, in their turn, depending
10 as they do each on an intellect, being expressed principles of the intellects, and being more diffused than they are, having in a way become much from little, and being in contact with the little which is, in each instance, less divided than they are. They want to be divided, even though unable to proceed to a full state of division, preserving as they do both identity and difference, and so each remains one, and all together are one.

15 We have, then, already given a summary of the argument that the souls come from one Soul, and those that are from the one Soul are many in the identical manner [intellects are] in Intellect, being divided and yet not divided in the identical manners,²⁶ and the Soul that remains above is a unique expressed principle of Intellect, and from it come individual expressed principles which are yet immaterial, as it is in the intelligible world.

²³ I.e., nature. ²⁴ I.e., our undescended intellects. Cf. 3.8.5.9 11.

²⁵ I.e., separation from the body. ²⁶ Retaining the words *κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ* of the mss.

§4.3.6. But why has the soul of the universe, though being of the same kind as ours, produced a cosmos, while the individual soul has not, though it, too, has everything in itself? It has already been stated that it is able to come to be and exist in many things simultaneously.²⁷ But now we should say – and perhaps indeed it will become known how the identical thing when it is in different things can produce one thing or another, or be acted on in one way or another, or both; in fact, this must be considered separately on its own – how and why the soul of the universe has produced the cosmos, while the others manage just some part of the cosmos.

In fact, it is not surprising that of those who have scientific understanding of the identical subject some are in control of more parts of it and some of fewer – but one might ask why this should be. One could answer that there are differences in souls. Or rather, it is because the soul of the universe has not departed from Soul, but has the body around itself while it remains above, while our souls have been allotted shares of a body which already exists with their sister soul [the soul of the universe],²⁸ in a way, this soul having also, in a way, previously prepared dwellings for them. And it may be the case that the one looks to the whole of Intellect, while the others look rather to their own partial intellects – and perhaps even these would be capable of producing a universe, but since the other had already done so, it was no longer possible for them, that one having begun it first. The identical question would have been raised if any other one had been the first to take on the role.

The better response, however, is to say that it does so because it is more closely dependent on the Beings above, for the power of the things that have inclined to the intelligible world is greater. For when souls preserve themselves in a safe condition, they produce with the greatest ease, and it is characteristic of a greater power not to be affected by the things that it produces;²⁹ and the power derives from remaining above. Remaining in itself, then, it produces when things approach it, whereas the other souls have to do the approaching themselves. They have, then, departed to the [corporeal] depths.

In fact, a great part of them is dragged down and has with their notions dragged them down with it.³⁰ For one must suppose that the ‘seconds and thirds’³¹ were so called because they are closer or further away, just as among us there does not exist in all souls the same relation to the things in the intelligible world; some would be united to them,

²⁷ Cf. *supra* 3 5. ²⁸ Cf. 2.9.18.16. ²⁹ I.e., soul is not affected by bodies.

³⁰ Cf. 2.9.2.8 16.

³¹ I.e., souls that are second or third in degree of purity. See Pl., *Tim.* 41D4 42D5.

some would shoot nearer the target in their aim, but others would be less able to do this, insofar as they are not actively using the identical powers; some are active with the first, some with the one coming after that, and others with the third, though all possess all the powers.³²

§4.3.7. So much, then, about that. But what about the passage in *Philebus* which suggests that other souls are parts of the soul of the universe?³³ This text, however, does not have the meaning that some might think, but is rather designed to emphasize what was of concern to Plato at that point, namely, to assert that the heaven, too, is ensouled. He argues for this by saying that it is absurd to say that the heaven is devoid of soul, while we, who have a part of the body of the whole universe, do have a soul. For how could the part have had a soul when the whole has no soul? He makes his position quite clear, however, in *Timaeus* where, when the soul of the universe has come to be, the Demiurge produces the others later, mixing them from the same mixing bowl from which comes the soul of the universe, making the other one the same in kind but contriving the difference by the use of the ‘second and third [levels of purity]’.³⁴

But what about the passage in *Phaedrus*, ‘All soul cares for what is without soul’?³⁵ For what would it be, other than soul, that manages the nature of the body and either moulds it, structures it, or produces it? There is no indication here that one soul is such as to be able to do this, and another is not.

Well, on the other hand, he says, it is the ‘perfect’ soul, the soul of the universe that ‘ranges on high’ and never sinks down, but rides, in a way, on top, that produces things in the cosmos, and every soul that is perfect manages it in this way. But by speaking of ‘the other which sheds its feathers’,³⁶ he postulates this as another soul distinct from that one.

As for our following the circuit of the universe, and acquiring our character from there and being affected by it,³⁷ this would be no indication that our souls are parts [of the soul of the universe]. For a soul is able to take on many characteristics from the nature of places and waters and air; and then there is the effect of dwelling in different cities, and the mixtures of which bodies are composed. And we have said that, due to our being in the universe, we have something of the soul of the universe, and we have conceded that we are affected by the circuit of the universe, but we postulated another soul standing apart from these

³² Cf. 6.7.9.18–22. The first power is intellection, the second discursive thinking, and the third non-rational or non-reflective.

³³ See Pl., *Phil.* 30A3–B7. ³⁴ See Pl., *Tim.* 41D4–7.

³⁵ See Pl., *Phdr.* 246B7–C5. ³⁶ See Pl., *Phdr.* 246B7–C2.

³⁷ See Pl., *Tim.* 90C8–D1.

affections, one that shows itself to be different most particularly due to its opposition.³⁸ But as regards the fact that we are generated within the universe, in respect of wombs, too, we declare that the soul which comes in is another one, not that of the mother. 30

§4.3.8. This, then, is how it is with respect to the solution of these problems, and the fact of [cosmic] sympathy does not stand in the way of the argument.³⁹ Since all souls come from the identical source that the soul of the universe comes from as well, they are in sympathy with one another. Indeed, we have already said that they are respectively one and many. We have also discussed how the part differs from the whole.⁴⁰ 5
 In addition, we have talked, in a general way, about differences among souls,⁴¹ but let us now add, briefly, that besides exhibiting differences in respect of their bodies, it would be possible for them to differ, most particularly, in their characters, and also in the discursive thinking and as a result of the lives they have lived before, for Plato says that the souls' choices are made in accordance with their previous lives.⁴² 10

And if someone were to take the nature of soul in general, the differences in these have been spoken of in the texts where the 'seconds and thirds' were mentioned,⁴³ and also that all of them are all things, but each soul is what it is according to what is active in it;⁴⁴ that is, by one being actually in a state of unification, another in a condition of knowing, another in a condition of desire, and in the fact that different souls 15
 look to different things and are or become what it is that they are looking to; fulfilment or perfection for souls, after all, is not the identical thing for all of them.

But if their whole structure is variegated – for every one expressed principle is multiple and variegated, like an ensouled living being having many forms – indeed, if this is the case, there is a structured ordering, and Beings are not entirely disconnected from one other, nor is there 20
 randomness among Beings, seeing as there is none in bodies either, from which it follows that there is some fixed number of them.

For again, Beings must be stable and intelligibles must be self-identical, and each of them must be numerically one; that is how each is an individual. For some things, since because of the nature of bodies 25
 their individual character is in a state of flux, inasmuch as their form is extraneous, their existence in accordance with a form is due to imitation of Beings; for these latter, inasmuch as they do not exist as a result of composition, their existence is in what is numerically one, which is there from the start, and they neither become what they were not nor will they 30

³⁸ A reference to the intellectual soul, or intellect. ³⁹ Cf. 3.1.8; 4.9.3.1 9.

⁴⁰ Cf. *supra* 2.4 5. ⁴¹ Cf. *supra* 6. ⁴² See Pl., *Rep.* 620A2 3.

⁴³ See Pl., *Tim.* 41D7. ⁴⁴ Cf. *supra* 6.27 34.

not be what they are, since if there is to be something which produces them, it would not be producing them from matter. And even if that were the case, it would have to add something substantial from itself; so, there will be change affecting that thing itself, if indeed it produces to a greater or lesser extent at a given time. But why is this so at a given time and not always? And what comes to be is not everlasting if 'to a greater or lesser extent' applies to it. But we have established that the soul is a thing of this sort.

How, then, can it be unlimited, if it is to be stable?⁴⁵

In fact, it is unlimited in power because its power is unlimited, not in the sense that the soul will be divided to unlimitedness. For the god,⁴⁶ too, is not limited. So, these souls are also not what each of them is due to an extraneous limitation, for example, as being of such and such a magnitude, but it is of the magnitude it wants to be, and as it proceeds it will never come to be outside itself, but it will reach everywhere – that part of it whose nature is to reach to bodies. It is not detached from itself when it is in the finger or in the foot. Indeed, it is in the universe, wherever it reaches, in the way it would be in one part or another of a plant even if it has been cut off, so that it is in the original plant and in the piece that has been cut off from it. For the body of the universe is one, and soul is in all of it everywhere as in a single thing.

When an animal has rotted, if many things come from it, the original soul of the whole animal will no longer be in the body for the body no longer has the potency to receive it; otherwise, the animal would not have died. But the things that result from its perishing which are suitable for the making of living beings, some of some and others of others, have soul, there being nothing from which it stands apart, but there are some things that are able to receive it and some that are not. And the things that have become ensouled in this way have not increased the number of souls, for they depend on the one soul, which remains one. Just as in us, if some parts are cut off, others grow in their place, so soul has departed from some things and attached itself to others, while the one soul remains as it is. In the universe, of course, the one soul always remains as it is; but of the things within it, some retain soul and some slough it off, while the powers of soul remain identical.

§4.3.9. But we must also investigate how soul comes to be in body. What is the manner in which it does this? For this is no less worthy of wonder and investigation. So, since the ways in which the soul enters a body are two – the one happens to a soul which is already in a body,

⁴⁵ Or: how will the number of souls be unlimited if Soul is stable?

⁴⁶ The reference is to Intellect, but it also applies to the One.

either a soul that is changing bodies or one that is coming to an earthy body from an airy or fiery one, which they do not actually call changing bodies because the starting point of the entrance is not clear; while the other is when the soul comes to any body whatsoever from an incorporeal state, which would actually constitute the soul's first association with body – it would be proper for us to investigate this latter case, asking whatever it is that happens when the soul, having been entirely uncontaminated with body, takes upon itself a corporeal nature. 10

Concerning, then, the soul of the universe – for it is perhaps fitting, or rather essential, to begin with that – we should certainly take its 'entry' into its body and the body's 'ensoulment' as terms used for the purposes of teaching and of clarity. There never was a time, in fact, when the universe was not ensouled, nor when body existed in the absence of soul, nor was there a time when matter existed and was not ordered; but it is possible to conceptualize these things theoretically in separation from each other. For it is possible to unpack any composite in theory, that is, in an act of discursive thinking. 15 20

The truth is like this: if there were no body, soul would not proceed forth, since there is no other place where it is its nature to be; but if it is going to proceed, it will produce a place for itself, and thus a body.⁴⁷ Soul's stability is in a way actually reinforced by Stability itself;⁴⁸ one might compare the situation to an intense light which sheds its illumination to the furthest limits of the fire, and that beyond there arises darkness; this the soul sees, and since the darkness is there as a substrate, gives it form. For it is not right for whatever borders on soul to be without a share in an expressed principle, if only of the kind that is received, as the saying goes, 'dimly in the dimness' of generated being.⁴⁹ 25

Indeed, this [cosmos] has, in a way, come to be like a beautiful and variegated house, which has not been cut off from its creator; then again, he has not given a share of himself to it, though all of it everywhere was considered worthy of beneficial care, both to its existence and to its beauty, insofar as it is actually possible for it to participate in Existence; this involves no harm to the one in charge of it, for he looks after it while remaining above. 30

It is ensouled in this kind of way, having soul not of itself, but for itself, ruled while not ruling, possessed but not possessing. For it is located in the Soul which holds it up, and nothing lacks a share in it, as if a net, submerged in the waters, were alive, without being able to make its own that in which it is. But the net is extended along with the already 35 40

⁴⁷ Cf. 3.9.3.9 13. ⁴⁸ Stability is one of the five μέγιστα γένη ('greatest genera').

⁴⁹ Cf. 3.4.1.8 17; 3.6.14.20 23; 3.9.3.2; 6.3.8.36.

extended sea to the limit of its capacity, each of its parts being unable to be anywhere other than where it is.

The soul, however, is, of its nature, so extensive, because it is not itself of any particular magnitude, as to be able to comprehend the whole of body with a single embrace, and wherever the body extends, the soul is there; but if body did not exist, the soul would have no concern for magnitude. For soul is what it is. The universe is of a size which corresponds to where soul is, and it is bounded by its volume, extending to the degree that it has soul itself preserving it in existence. And the soul's shadow extends as far as the expressed principle that derives from it. And the expressed principle is of such a kind as to produce a magnitude that is as great as the magnitude that its form wanted to produce.

§4.3.10. Having completed this exposition, we must turn back to what is always in the state that it is, and grasp it all together as one simultaneity; for example, as air, light, the sun, or the moon and light and the sun again, all together, but having an order as first and second and third things; similarly, in the sensible world we have soul, always stable, then,⁵⁰ the first things and the ones that come next, like the ultimate stages of a fire, what follows on the first being thought of as the shadow at the edge of the fire, and then that, too, being illuminated at the same time, so that something like a form runs over what has been put in its path, something that was initially entirely obscure.

It was ordered according to the expressed principle of a soul which potentially had in all of itself the power to order things according to expressed principles; it is analogous to the way that the expressed principles in seeds mould and shape animals, like microcosms. Whatever touches soul is produced in a way that fits the nature of the soul's substantiality; and the soul does not produce on the basis of a plan that is extraneous to it, nor does it wait for consultation or investigation; for if that were the case, it would produce not according to nature, but according to an extraneous craft. For craft is posterior to soul and imitates it, making obscure and weak imitations, just toys in a way, things of little worth, using many contrivances to produce an image of nature.⁵¹

But soul, by the power of its substantiality, is sovereign over bodies with respect to their coming to be and their being in such states as it directs them to be in, without their ultimate principles being able to oppose its will. At a lower level, there are elements which hinder each

⁵⁰ Reading εἴτα with the mss and adding <τὰ> before πρῶτα.

⁵¹ See Pl., *Lg.* 889A4 8, C6 D2; Ar., *Phys* 2.2.194a21 22.

other and are thus often held back from attaining their proper form, which the expressed principle at the microcosmic level wants to produce; but there at the higher level the whole form comes to be under its agency and the things that have come to be have order all at once, and what has come to be attains beauty effortlessly and without hindrance. 25

Now in the universe, soul has constructed images of gods, habitats for human beings, and other things for other types of being. What, after all, should come to be from soul other than things for which it has the productive power? It pertains to fire to make things hot, and to something else to make them cold; but soul has a part which resides in itself and another that goes out from it to something else. In things without soul, the part that is internal to them is dormant, in a way, but another part which goes out from them to something else assimilates to itself what can be affected by it; and indeed it is common to everything which exists to bring other things to a state of assimilation to themselves. 30 35

But the function of soul is something wakeful, both that aspect which is internal to it, and that which goes out to something else. It, therefore, makes other things alive which do not have life on their own account, and live a life of the sort which it itself lives. Living as it does, then, in accordance with an expressed principle, it gives an expressed principle to the body, an image of the one it has itself – for what it gives to the body is only an image of life – and also shapes of bodies, of which it has the expressed principles. And indeed it also has those of gods and of all things; for this reason, the cosmos has everything that it has. 40

§4.3.11. It seems to me that the sages of old who wanted to attract to themselves the presence of the gods, and built temples and statues to that end, looking to the nature of the universe, had in mind that the nature of the soul is a thing that is in general easy to attract, but the easiest way of all to receive it would be if one were to craft something sympathetic which was able to receive some share of it. And that is sympathetic which is in any way imitative of it, like a mirror able to capture some image of it. Indeed, the nature of the universe, having with ease produced all things in imitation of the Beings whose expressed principles it possesses, since each thing came to be as it is as an expressed principle in matter – this expressed principle being formed in accordance with one that is prior to matter⁵² – joined it to that god [Intellect] in accordance with which it came to be and to which the soul looked, and which it possessed, in its producing.⁵³ Indeed, it was impossible for the thing produced to come to be without a share in Intellect, nor again for it [Intellect] to come down into it.⁵⁴ 5 10

⁵² I.e., a Form or Forms.

⁵³ Cf. 4.7.13,14 20; 5.8.7.12 16.

⁵⁴ Cf. 2.1.5,5 8.

15 That sun in the intelligible world was actually Intellect – let us take that as a model in our discussion – and Soul comes next to it, being dependent on Intellect, maintaining its stability while the Intellect, too, remains stable. Soul actually gives its outer edges, those bordering on this sun in this cosmos, to this sun and, through itself as an intermediary, forges a link with the intelligible world, and becomes, in a way, an interpreter of messages from that sun to this one, and those from this

20 one to that one, insofar as they can reach it through the agency of Soul. Nothing, after all, is a long way off or far from anything else, and yet again things are far removed from one another due to difference and absence of mixture, but divine things are on their own, and are present to things here while remaining separate. The heavenly beings in this cosmos attain divine status by never standing apart from the gods there;

25 they depend on the original Soul by means of the soul that has, in a way, departed from it, and by means of it, by which they both exist and are what they are called, they look to Intellect, with their souls not looking anywhere other than to the intelligible world.

§4.3.12. The souls of human beings saw images of themselves as though in the mirror of Dionysus⁵⁵ and went in that direction, starting forth from the intelligible world, but even so these are not cut off from their own source or from Intellect. For they did not come down with Intellect, but they descended on the one hand as far as the earth, while

5 on the other, their heads are still ‘firmly fixed above the heavens’.⁵⁶ However, it happened that they descended to a greater extent than they should have, because their middle part was constrained, since attention was demanded by that to which they had descended. Father Zeus, though, took pity on them in their labours and made their shackles, the focus of their toil, mortal, and grants them periods of respite,

10 making them free from bodies from time to time, so that they, too, can be in the intelligible world where the soul of the universe always is, never turning its attention towards the things of this world.

For what it has is already the universe, and that is and will be sufficient unto itself, and it completes its revolution in stretches of time in accordance with expressed principles which do not change.

15 And the things in it are always brought back to the identical state in accordance with the passage of time, in measures consisting of determined lives, and they are brought to a state of concord with the things in

⁵⁵ An allusion to the Orphic myth of the seduction of Dionysus by the Titans with a toy provided by Hera, which leads to the dismemberment and devouring of Dionysus, with only his heart saved by Athena.

⁵⁶ The undescended intellect. Cf. *supra* 5.6; 3.4.3.24; 4.8.4.30 35; 4.8.8; 6.7.5.26 29, 17.26 27; 6.8.6.41 43. See Homer, *Il.* 4.443.

the intelligible world, the things here also fulfilling their role in accordance with those there, with everything being ordered according to a single expressed principle in terms of the descents and ascents of souls, and in respect of everything else, too.⁵⁷

Evidence of this is the concord of the souls with the order of this universe, souls which are not detached, but in their descent put themselves in touch with it, and with its circuit produce a single concord, so that their fortunes, their lives, and their choices are indicated by the configurations of the stars, and, in a way, give out a single sound that is not out of tune; and this is rather the real meaning of the enigmatic references to musicality and harmoniousness.⁵⁸ This would not have been so unless the universe acted and was acted upon in accordance with each of those things in measures consisting of periods and orders and passing through lives in their several kinds, lives which the souls pass through, sometimes in the intelligible world, sometimes in heaven, and sometimes turning towards regions here. 20

Intellect as a whole, for its part, is always above and would never come to be outside its own world; rather, it is established above as a whole and sends [messages] to things here by way of Soul. Soul, since it is nearer to it, is disposed according to the Form that comes from the intelligible world and gives it to the things below itself; to one kind of soul, always in the same way, to another in different ways at different times, while maintaining order in its comings and goings. 25 It does not always descend to the same extent, but sometimes does so more and sometimes less, even if it is descending into the identical kind of [body]; each goes, in fact, to the body that is ready for it by its assimilation to the disposition [of the soul]. For each soul goes there to whatever destination to which it has been likened, one to a human being, another to another kind of living being.⁵⁹ 30 35

§4.3.13. For thus are the ineluctable prescription and justice based in a nature⁶⁰ which forces each thing to go in order to its proper destination, and which comes to be as an image of the model corresponding to its original choice and disposition; all that kind of soul is akin to that in conformity with which it possesses its own disposition; and it does not need the thing that once sent it forth and introduced it to its destination, neither in order to go towards body at a certain time, nor to go to a particular body, but when its time arrives it goes down spontaneously, 5

⁵⁷ See *SVF* 2.599 (= Arius Didymus *apud* Eusebius, *Pr. ev.* 15.19.1), 625 (= Nemesius, *De nat. hom.* 38.277).

⁵⁸ See *Pl., Rep.* 617B4 7.

⁵⁹ Perhaps in a previous incarnation. Cf. 3.4.2.12 30; 6.7.7. See *Pl., Rep.* 619B 620D.

⁶⁰ This is the lowest part of the soul of the cosmos.

in a way, and enters the body it must enter – and there is a different time
 10 for different souls, and when this comes up to it, like the summons of
 a herald, it descends – and it enters the appropriate body, so that the
 things that come to be are moved and carried about as if by the powers of
 magicians and strong forces of the sort that pull them. It is like the way
 in which the development of the living being is brought to perfection in
 15 each single body, with the soul initiating and generating each feature,
 like the growing of beards and the sprouting of horns and impulses at
 a given moment in this or that direction, and efflorescences on the skin
 which were not there before, and so, too, in the case of the development
 of trees which grow at fixed times.

The souls go neither voluntarily nor because they have been sent – or
 at least their volition is not such as would arise from a choice; it is more
 like a natural leap, as it might be towards a natural desire for marriage,
 20 or in another case towards the accomplishment of some beautiful deeds,
 not provoked by calculative reasoning. But things of a certain kind
 always have a fate of a certain kind, for a thing of one kind being realized,
 perhaps, now, for another later. The Intellect prior to the cosmos has its
 fate, too, to remain in the intelligible world, and sends forth as much as
 25 possible, that is, particular things are sent forth subject to the universal
 law. For the universal bears down upon each thing, and the law does not
 derive its power of fulfilment from outside, but it is given to be in things
 themselves⁶¹ that use it and bear it wherever they go. And if and when
 the time comes, then what the law wants to happen happens through the
 30 agency of the things which instantiate it, so that they bring it to fulfil-
 ment inasmuch as they are bearing it, and it derives its strength from
 being located in them, as though weighing down upon them and produc-
 ing in them a desire and a pang to go where, in a way, the law in them
 tells them to go.⁶²

§4.3.14. Given that all this has actually occurred, this ordered cosmos,
 which shines already with many lights and is illuminated by souls,
 receives further forms of order in addition to the previous ones, deriving
 one from another, both from the gods there and from the other intel-
 5 lects which produce souls.⁶³ Such, it seems, is the enigmatic meaning of
 the myth, which tells how, when Prometheus had fashioned the woman,
 the other gods, too, adorned her.⁶⁴ It says he ‘mixed earth with water’
 and put a human voice in her, and made her like the goddesses in
 appearance, and Aphrodite gave her something and so did the Graces,
 10 and other gods gave her other gifts, and they named her from the gift

⁶¹ Reading αὐτοῖς <τοῖς> with HS⁴ following Kirchhoff. ⁶² Cf. 4.8.3 6.

⁶³ Cf. 6.4.14.18 19. ⁶⁴ See Hesiod, *Works and Days* 60 89.

and from all the givers; for all gave their share to this product fashioned by a certain providence.⁶⁵ But what could the instruction to Epimetheus to reject the gift mean other than that the choice of what is in the intelligible world is better? And he who fashioned it is himself in bondage⁶⁶ because he is somehow still attached to what has come to be through him, and this kind of bond comes from outside. And the liberation by Heracles signifies that he has power within him, such that even so he can free himself. 15

Now one may interpret this story any way one wants; the important thing is that it is the circumstances of the gift to the cosmos that is the clear subject of this story, and that is in harmony with my account.

§4.3.15. The souls proceed, then, peering out from the intelligible world, in the first instance into heaven, and, taking on a body⁶⁷ there, they then pass by means of it to more earthy bodies, to the degree to which they are extended in length. Some go from heaven to the lower level of bodies, while others are inserted from some bodies into others, those, that is, whose power was not adequate to raise them from here because of the considerable heaviness and forgetfulness laid upon them, dragging about with them the burden with which they were laden. They become different either by reason of the variation of the bodies into which they are put, or by virtue of accidents of fortune or upbringing, or because they bring with them differences derived from themselves, or for all of these reasons, or certain of them. And some of them have become entirely subject to the fate that rules the sensible world, and some are sometimes in this state, and sometimes under their own control, and some acquiesce in affection as much as is necessary, although they retain the power to keep under their control the things that are their own proper functions, living according to another law-code that applies to all beings, while submitting themselves to this other dispensation. 5 10 15

This code is constructed from all of the expressed principles and causes operative in this world, and from souls' motions and the laws that come from the intelligible world, acting in harmony with these latter and taking its principles from there, and weaving together with them what comes after them, while preserving unshaken all the things which can hold themselves in conformity with the disposition of what is above, and taking the rest round as is natural for them, so that the responsibility 20

⁶⁵ Based on the etymology of the name 'Prometheus' προμηθεΐα, 'forethought'.

⁶⁶ Plotinus now adduces the myth of Prometheus' binding by Zeus, and freeing by Heracles, from Hesiod, *Theog.* 521–528.

⁶⁷ The pneumatic or astral or ethereal body or 'soul vehicle'. See Pl., *Phdr.* 246B2, 247B2; *Tim.* 41E1–2, 75A5–E9.

resides in the souls that have come down,⁶⁸ because they have done so in such a way that some have found themselves in one situation, while others are placed in another.⁶⁹

§4.3.16. It is, then, appropriate to attribute to the order of the world the punishments that justly affect the wicked, insofar as it directs things in accordance with what is fitting;⁷⁰ but as for the injustices that fall upon good men, such as punishments, poverty or disease, are we to say that these happen because of previous moral errors? For these things are woven into the texture of the whole and indicated beforehand, so that these, too, happen in accordance with reason.

In fact, these are not in accordance with the expressed principles of nature, nor were they among the antecedent causes; rather, they follow on these. For example, when a building collapses, a person who happens to be under it dies, whatever his moral quality, or when a pair of horses are moving in good order, or even a single horse, anything that crosses their path will be injured or trampled upon. Either this injustice, while it is bad for its victim, is useful for the texture of the world or it is actually not unjust, deriving its justification from previous events. For we may not hold that some things have been subjected to the order, while others have been left on a looser rein, in the interests of preserving autonomy.

For if it is necessary that things happen in accordance with causes and natural consequences, and in conformity with a single expressed principle and one order, one should believe that even the smaller things have also been included in the order and woven in with the others.⁷¹ Injustice which is actually done by one person to another is unjust for the perpetrator, and the doer is not released from blame, but as subsumed within the order of the universe it is not unjust within that, not even as regards the victim, but that is how it had to be. And if the victim is a good person, the end of these things is for the good. One should believe that this structured ordering is ‘not without god’⁷² nor unjust, but is exact as regards the distribution of what is appropriate, while believing, on the other hand, that it has unclear causes and allows grounds for complaint to those who do not know them.

§4.3.17. One might infer that the souls first go from the intelligible world to the region of heaven from such considerations as the following. If heaven is the better part of the sensible region, it would be contiguous with the lowest of the intelligibles.⁷³ So, heaven is the first thing coming from the intelligible world to be ensouled and to participate in it, as

⁶⁸ I.e., reincarnated. See Pl., *Rep.* 617C5. ⁶⁹ Cf. 3.1.10.2 10.

⁷⁰ See Pl., *Lg.* 904A6 C4. ⁷¹ Cf. 3.2.9.31 40. ⁷² See Homer, *Od.* 18.353.

⁷³ See Pl., *Phdr.* 246D6 247E6.

being more suited to doing so. What is earthy comes last, and is of a nature to participate in a lesser soul, and is far from incorporeal nature. All souls actually illuminate the heaven and in a way give the major part of themselves, that is, their first part to it, but light up the rest of the cosmos with their subsequent parts; those which descend further illuminate the lower regions, but it is not better for them to proceed downwards to any great extent.⁷⁴ 10

For there is something like a centre, and in addition to it a circle shining from it, and in addition to these another circle, light coming from light.⁷⁵ But outside these there is another circle no longer of light; this one needs the brightness that belongs to another, since it is lacking its own light. Let this last one be a wheel, or, actually, a sphere of that kind, which receives from the third one – because it is next to it – the amount of light that that one throws. The great light, then, remains where it is and shines out, and the brightness that comes from it goes through the world in due proportion, and the others join with it in its shining, some remaining where they are, while others are drawn out to a greater extent by the alluring gleam of what they shine on.⁷⁶ 15 20

Next, since the things illuminated require more care, so souls – like boats in a storm when helmsmen concentrate to a greater extent on their care for the ships and do not notice that they are neglecting themselves, thereby often risking being pulled down with the wreck of their ships – incline to a greater extent and pull down the things that are theirs. 25

Next they were held down, shackled by the fetters of sorcery, constrained by their care for [their corporeal] nature. But if each living being were such as the universe is, a perfect and adequate body and one not at risk of being affected, the soul which is said to be present would not have had to be present to it, and would give life to it while remaining entirely in the world above. 30

§4.3.18. Does the soul use calculative reasoning before it comes, and again on its departure?

In fact, calculative reasoning comes in when the soul is already in difficulty, filled with care, and weaker than it was; the need for calculative reasoning betokens a diminution of intellect in respect of its self-sufficiency – as is the case with crafts, where calculative reasoning is for 5

⁷⁴ A distinction among the soul of the cosmos, nature, its lowest part, and individual souls. These are all parts of Soul. Cf. *supra* 15.1 7.

⁷⁵ The centre is the One, the first circle Intellect, and the next circle Soul. The remaining circle is the sensible world.

⁷⁶ The great light is the soul of the cosmos, the next source of illumination refers to the souls of the heavenly bodies, and the last illuminating and illuminated group are human souls.

craftsmen faced by difficulties, but when there is no problem the craft itself takes control and does the work.

One might ask, however, if the souls were in the intelligible world without calculative reasoning, how could they still be regarded as rational?

In fact, one might reply, it is because they have the capacity, when the situation demands, to find a good solution by thinking through to it.
 10 One should think of calculative reasoning, after all, as something like this: if one takes calculative reasoning as that disposition which constantly derives from Intellect and is always present in souls, a stable activity and something like a reflection of it, then they would be using calculative reasoning even in the intelligible world.⁷⁷

One should not, I think, imagine that they actually use speech when
 15 they are in the intelligible world, and at all events, even if they have bodies when they are in heaven,⁷⁸ all the things that they would talk about in the sensible world because of needs or disagreements would not exist in the intelligible world. And as they do everything in order and in conformity with nature, they would not be involved in giving instructions or advice, but would know things from each other with a comprehensive grasp. For in the sensible world, too, even without
 20 people saying anything, we would know many things from their eyes. But in the intelligible world all body is pure, and each is like an eye, and nothing is hidden or fabricated, but before one speaks to another, one has come to know the situation just by looking. But in the case of daemons and souls in the air, there is nothing odd about their employing speech; for they are living beings of such a kind as to do this.

§4.3.19. Are the 'indivisible' and the 'divisible' in the identical place,⁷⁹ as though mixed together, or is the indivisible in a different place, and corresponding to a different object, while the divisible, in a way, comes next after it, and is a different part of the soul, even as we say that the
 5 calculative part is one thing and the non-rational part another?

This question may be resolved by grasping clearly what we mean by each of these terms. Now Plato uses the term 'indivisible' unqualifiedly, but 'divisible' with a qualification; he says that the soul becomes 'divisible among bodies', implying thus that it has not antecedently been divided. We should look at the nature of the body and see what kind of
 10 soul it needs to be alive, and what part of soul must be present to body, everywhere and to all of it.

⁷⁷ Cf. 2.9.1.30; 4.4.1.35.

⁷⁸ A reference to the astral or pneumatic body or ethereal body or 'soul vehicle' enveloping soul midway between the sensible and the intelligible worlds. Cf. *supra* 15.1.3.

⁷⁹ See Pl., *Tim.* 35A1-3.

The whole faculty of sense-perception, if indeed one perceives throughout the body, comes to be divided; for inasmuch as it is everywhere, it may be said to be divided; but as it appears everywhere as a whole, it would not be said that it is absolutely divided, but rather that it ‘comes to be divided about bodies’. If someone were to say that it is not divided in respect of the other senses but only in that of touch, one must reply that it is necessary that it be divided like this in the case of the others, too, if it is the case that what participates in them is a body, even if to a lesser extent than in the case of touch. 15

Moreover, the same applies to its faculty of growth or increase; and if appetite functions around the liver, and spiritedness around the heart, the identical account applies to them, too.⁸⁰ But perhaps Plato⁸¹ does not include these in that mixture, and perhaps these arise in a different way and supervene on one of the faculties already included. 20

And calculative reasoning and intellect? These no longer give themselves to body. This is because their function is not performed through an organ of the body. For the body would be an impediment if one were to use it in one’s investigations.⁸² 25

Each of the two, the indivisible and the divisible, is, therefore, a different thing, and they are not mixed together as a single thing, but they are like a whole made of parts, with each of the two pure and separate in its power. Indeed, if what becomes divided among bodies derives its indivisibility from the power above,⁸³ the identical thing can be indivisible and divisible, as being mixed from itself and from the power that comes to it from above.⁸⁴ 30

§4.3.20. Further, we should address the question whether these and the other so-called parts of the soul are spatially located, or whether these are absolutely not, while the others are, and, if so, where they would be, or whether absolutely no part is spatially located.⁸⁵ For on the one hand, if we do not designate a place for each of the parts of the soul, but put none of them anywhere, putting it no more inside the body than outside it, we shall make it have no soul, and we shall be at a loss as to where it would be appropriate to say that the functions of the corporeal organs are exercised, while on the other hand, if we designate a place for some parts and not for others, we shall think that the ones for which we do not 5

⁸⁰ See Pl., *Tim.* 70A7 B2 and 70D7 71B1.

⁸¹ Possibly, the subject of the verb παραλαμβάνει (‘include’) is, as HS take it, τὸ σῶμα (‘body’).

⁸² Cf. 5.1.10.13 15. See Pl., *Phd.* 65A10 B1; Ar., *DA* 1.4.408b24; 2.2.413b24 29; 3.4.429a22 27.

⁸³ Perhaps a reference to the undescended intellect. ⁸⁴ Cf. 4.2.1.29 41.

⁸⁵ See Ar., *DA* 3.9.424a24 432b4.

10 designate one do not act within us, so that not all of our soul would be in us.

As a general principle, then, we should say that none of the parts of the soul, nor yet the whole of it, is in the body as in a place;⁸⁶ for place is a thing that contains something,⁸⁷ and specifically a thing that contains body,⁸⁸ and where each divided part of something is, there it is, so that it is not in any place as a whole. But soul is not a body, so it is not a thing
15 that is contained any more than a thing that contains. Nor yet is it in a body as in a vessel,⁸⁹ for in that case body would become a thing without soul, whether it contains soul as a vessel or as place – unless, after all, it is there due to some sort of transmission from the soul,⁹⁰ which remains concentrated in itself, and the amount that the vessel shares in will be lost to it. But place, strictly speaking, is incorporeal and
20 not a body; so why would it need soul?

Further, body would abut soul with its outer edge, not with itself. And there would be many other factors opposing its being in body as in a place. For if that were the case, the place would always be carried round with it, and there will be some other thing which carries the place itself around. And even if place were taken to be bare
25 extension,⁹¹ so much the more soul would not be in body as in a place. For extension has to be a void. But body is not a void; though perhaps that in which the body is will be, so that it would be the body that will be in a void.

Nor yet will it be in the body as in a substrate.⁹² For what is in
30 a substrate is a state of what it is in, like colour or shape, and soul, after all, is something separate. Nor will it be in it as a part in a whole; for the soul is not a part of the body. And if someone were to specify, ‘like a part of that whole which is the living being’, first, the identical problem would remain, which is how it would be in it as in a whole; for it is not actually as the wine is in the jar of wine, nor indeed as the jar, nor
35 anything else for that matter, will be in itself. Nor is it in it like a whole in the parts; for it is ridiculous to say that the soul is a whole and the body its parts.

But it is not like a form in matter either;⁹³ for the form in matter is inseparable, and the form comes later, when the matter already exists. But the soul, being distinct from the form, produces the form in the matter. If they are going to say that it is not the form that comes to be in

⁸⁶ See Alex. Aphr., *De an.* 14.17 19. ⁸⁷ See Ar., *Phys.* 4.4.212a20 21.

⁸⁸ See Ar., *Phys.* 4.5.212b29 30. ⁸⁹ See Ar., *Phys.* 2.2.209b1 2.

⁹⁰ Cf. 4.2.3.13; 4.7.7.7.

⁹¹ See Ar., *Phys.* 4.4.211b14 29; *SVF* 2.506 (= Themistius, *In Phys.* 4.4.113.11 12 Shenkl); Alex. Aphr., *De an.* 14.19 20.

⁹² See Alex. Aphr., *De an.* 14.24 15.5. ⁹³ See Alex. Aphr., *De an.* 16.1 5.

the matter, but the form as separate, it is still not clear how this form is in the body. How, then, is it that the soul is universally declared to be in the body?⁹⁴

In fact, it is because the soul is not a thing that can be seen, but the body is. Seeing a body, then, and understanding that it is a thing with soul because it is moved and has sense-perception, we say that the body has soul. And so it would seem to follow for us to say that the soul is in the body. If, on the other hand, the soul were something that could be seen or perceived, encompassed on all sides by life and extending equally to all the extremities of the body, we should not say that the soul is in the body, but rather that the thing which is subordinate is in the dominant being, and that what is held together is in what holds it together,⁹⁴ and that what is in flux is in what is not in flux. 50

§4.3.21. Well then, how is it present? If someone were to ask this, while offering no suggestion himself, what shall we say? And what if he asked about all of it uniformly, or if different parts are present in different ways? So, it is clear that none of the ways of something being in something else that we have just now been enumerating fits the case of soul in relation to body. There is, certainly, the suggestion that the soul is in the body in the way that a helmsman is in his ship;⁹⁵ that is helpful in respect of the soul's capacity to be separate, but it would not at all provide us with the manner of its presence, which is what we are now investigating. This is because as a sailor, the helmsman would be in the ship accidentally, but how would he be in it as helmsman? For he is in any case not in the whole ship in the way that the soul is in the whole body. 5 10

So, should we say that it is like a craft in its tools, for example, in the helm, if the helm were something with a soul, so that the helmsmanship which moves it in accordance with its craft would be inside it? But the difference here is that the craft originates outside. If, then, in accordance with the example of the helmsman entering into the helm, we were to propose that the soul is in the body as in a natural tool⁹⁶ – for that is how it moves it in whatever it wants to do – would we be any further along towards what we are looking for? Will we not rather have a problem again about how it is in the tool, even if this is a different way of being in something from those mentioned before?⁹⁷ But nonetheless we still have a desire to find out and come to closer grips with the problem. 15 20

§4.3.22. Should we say, then, that when soul is present to body, it is present in the way that fire is present to air? For fire, too, in its turn,

⁹⁴ See Pl., *Tim.* 36D8 E5; Ar., *DA* 2.1.412b12.

⁹⁵ See Ar., *DA* 2.1.413a9; Alex. Aphr., *De an.* 15.9 28.

⁹⁶ See Ar., *DA* 2.1.412b12.

⁹⁷ Cf. *supra* 3.

5 while being present, is not present and, while penetrating the air throughout, is yet mixed with no part of it, but stays where it is while the air flows by. And when the air comes to be outside the place where the light is, it departs while retaining nothing, but while it is under the light it is lit, so that it is right to say in this case, too, that the air is in the light, rather than that the light is in the air. Plato, therefore, does well in not locating the soul in the body in the case of the universe, but rather
10 the body in the soul, and⁹⁸ he also asserts that there is a part of the soul in which there is body, but another in which there is no body, by which he clearly means the powers of the soul which the body does not need.⁹⁹

Moreover, the identical account also applies in the case of the other souls. One should not say that there is a presence of the other powers of the soul to the body, but that those it needs are present, and that they are
15 present not by being located in the parts of the body, nor again in the whole of it, and in particular that for the purpose of sense-perception, the power of the faculty of sense-perception is present to everything that is provided with sense-perception, but for their various activities different parts of it are present to the different parts.¹⁰⁰

§4.3.23. What I mean is this: in the process of the ensouled body's being illuminated by soul, different parts of the body participate in it in different ways. In accordance with the suitability of an organ for a given
5 function, the soul provides the power appropriate for that function. In this way, we say that the power in the eyes is the power of sight, that in the ears the power of hearing, the power of taste in the tongue, that of smell in the nose, while the power of touch is present in the whole body; for the whole body serves as sense organ to the soul for this type of
10 apprehension. Since the organs of touch are situated at the first points of the nerves, which actually also have the power to move the living being since that is where this kind of power makes itself available and since the nerves start from the brain, they¹⁰¹ located the principle of sense-perception and impulse and in general of the whole living being here.
15 They assumed that what is going to use them is present where the principles of the organs clearly are – or rather, it is better to say that the start of the activation of the power is there – for it is at the place from which the organ was going to be moved that the power of the craftsman, in a way, which is appropriate to the organ would exert itself, or rather
20 not the power – for the power is everywhere – but the beginning of the activation is at the point where the principle of the organ is.

⁹⁸ Restoring the καί, the deletion of which by Vitranga is accepted by HS².

⁹⁹ Cf. 4.7.4-7; 5.5.9.29 30. See Pl., *Tim.* 34B4, 36D9 E3.

¹⁰⁰ I.e., the different senses are active in different parts of the body.

¹⁰¹ Perhaps a reference to discoveries of Hellenistic medical science as well as to Plato.

Since, then, the power of sense-perception and impulse proper to that soul which engages in sense-perception and imagination has reason above it, as a nature¹⁰² neighbouring on its lower side the thing above which it is, it was located by the ancients at the highest point in the animal, in the head, not in the brain as such, but in this faculty of sense-perception, which was seated in the brain in the way we have mentioned. For one part of the soul had to be granted to the body, and in particular to that part of the body that is receptive of activity; while the other part, which has nothing in common with the body, had need of associating fully with that other entity, which is a form of soul, and of a soul capable of apprehending what comes from reason. For the faculty of sense-perception is, in a way, one that judges,¹⁰³ and the faculty of imaginative representation is, in a way, intellectual,¹⁰⁴ as are impulse and desire which follow imagination and reason.

The faculty of calculative reasoning, then, is there [in the faculties of sense-perception and imaginative representation], not as in a place, but because what is there profits from its presence. And how the term 'there' applies to the faculty of sense-perception has been specified above.¹⁰⁵

Again, since the faculty of growth of the soul, that concerned with increase in size and nutrition, is not absent from any of the body but nourishes it with the blood, and the blood that nourishes is in the veins, and the starting point of the veins and the blood is in the liver,¹⁰⁶ the part of the soul that is the faculty of appetite has been assigned to live there, since this is where this power exerts its force; for what produces generation, nourishment, and increase in size must necessarily have an appetite for these things. But for the blood that is thin, light, active and pure, constituting a suitable organ for [the faculty of] spiritedness, its source, the heart¹⁰⁷ – this being where this kind of blood is separated off – has been established as a fitting home for the seething of [the faculty of] spiritedness.¹⁰⁸

§4.3.24. But where will the soul come to be when it has departed from the body?

In fact, it will not be in the sensible world, where there is nothing that can receive it in any way, nor can it stay on with what is not of a nature to receive it, unless we are to assume that soul, being in a senseless state,

¹⁰² Restoring φύσις with HS⁴ and transposed to after δν.

¹⁰³ See Ar., *DA* 2.12.424a4 6; 3.9.432a16.

¹⁰⁴ See Ar., *DA* 1.1.403a8 9; 3.8.427b28, 9.433a9 10. ¹⁰⁵ Cf. *supra* 15 21.

¹⁰⁶ See Pl., *Tim.* 70A7 B3.

¹⁰⁷ See Alex. Aphr., *De an.* 40.1 3; Ar., *PA* 3.4.666a7 8; *Somm. Vig.* 3.458a15 16.

¹⁰⁸ See Pl., *Tim.* 70A7 B3.

5 retains something of the body which draws soul to it.¹⁰⁹ But if it has some extraneous [corporeal] element, it will be in it, and it follows it to that place where it is this thing's nature to be or to come to be.

Given that there are many possible places for each such soul, the difference must have come from the respective disposition of each, and also from [natural] justice in things. For one will never escape suffering¹¹⁰ the due retribution for unjust acts; there is no dodging the divine law, which has inherent in it the execution of the judgement already made. The person on whom it is inflicted is unwittingly borne towards what it is proper for him to suffer, blown about everywhere on an unstable motion in his wanderings, but in the end, as if greatly exhausted by his resistance,¹¹¹ he falls into the place appropriate to him, taking on involuntary suffering as a result of his voluntary motion.¹¹² And it has been specified in the law how much he must suffer and for how long, and again there is a concordance between the release from punishment and the power of escaping upwards from those places, through the power of that harmony which controls everything.¹¹³

20 Now when they have bodies, the souls have the capacity to apprehend corporeal punishments; but those of the souls that are pure and in no way drag any part of the body with them will necessarily exist nowhere in body. If, then, they are not anywhere in body – for they have no body – they will be in the intelligible world where there is Substantiality and Existence¹¹⁴ and the divine, in god;¹¹⁵ there, and with these, and in god will such a soul be. And if you still look to know where, you must look to the world where those things are. But when you look for them, look not with your eyes, nor as if you are looking for bodies.

5 §4.3.25. On the subject of memory, it is likewise worth investigating whether the souls themselves, when they have left these regions, have the capacity to remember, or whether some do and some do not, and whether they remember everything or some things, and whether they will continue to remember always, or only for a certain time, close to their departure hence.

But if we are going to conduct a proper investigation into this question, we must first get a clear idea of precisely what it is that

¹⁰⁹ Cf. 1.6.8.21 27. See Pl., *Phd.* 81C9 D4; *Lg.* 904A6 905A1.

¹¹⁰ Replacing the typographically erroneous *ποθεῖν* with *παθεῖν*.

¹¹¹ See Callimachus, fr. 23.20 Pfeiffer. ¹¹² Cf. 4.8.5.8 10.

¹¹³ See Pl., *Phdr.* 248C2 249D3.

¹¹⁴ Probably an allusion to Pl., *Rep.* 509B5 9, where τὸ εἶναι ('Existence') and οὐσία ('Substantiality') are the direct endowment of the Idea of the Good on the intelligible world. Here the word τὸ ὄν ('Being') is used rather than the more frequent τὸ εἶναι.

¹¹⁵ I.e., Intellect.

remembers. I do not mean what memory is, but rather in which of the things that are it naturally has its place. The question as to what memory is has been discussed elsewhere,¹¹⁶ and indeed repeatedly so, but what we need to grasp more precisely now is what it is that has the natural capacity to remember. 10

Now if memory is of something acquired, either as something learned or something experienced, memory would not exist in those beings which are incapable of being affected or which are not in time. Indeed, one should not attribute memory to a god or to Being or to Intellect; for these have no element of time, but Being is attended by eternity and there is no before and after there; it is always as it is and in the identical state, and admits of no alteration. How, after all, could what is in an identical and uniform condition be involved in memory, since it neither has nor maintains a different state after the one it had before, or a different act of intellection after another one, so that it would be in one state, while remembering the different one that it was in before? 15 20

But what prevents it from knowing the changes in other things, such as the circuits of the cosmos, without itself changing?

In fact, this cannot be, because then it would be thinking first one thing and then another, following the changes of what is altered, and remembering is a different process from thinking. And one must not say that it remembers its own acts of thinking. For these did not come to it, so that it would need to lay hold of them to stop them going away; indeed, if that were the case, one would be afraid that its own substantiality would depart from it. 25

So, on identical grounds neither should we say that the soul remembers things which are parts of its nature¹¹⁷ although, when once it is in the sensible world, it is possible for it to possess them while not being active in respect of them, particularly when it has just come to the sensible world. But as for its being active, the ancients seem to apply 'memory' or 'recollection' to souls that activate what they have within them.¹¹⁸ For this reason, recollection would be another kind of memory; hence, time is not attached to memory in this sense. 30

But perhaps we are being careless about this question, and deficient in critical sense. For someone might raise the question as to whether this kind of memory or recollection that is cited does not belong to that soul, 35

¹¹⁶ Cf. 3.6.2.42 54, but Plotinus is doubtless thinking of discussions by earlier authorities, as well as oral discussions in his own circle.

¹¹⁷ Perhaps expressed principles, that is, images of the Forms that the disembodied soul naturally possesses.

¹¹⁸ See Pl., *Men.* 86B; *Phd.* 72E5 7.

but to another more obscure type,¹¹⁹ or perhaps to the complex of body and soul, the living being.¹²⁰ If it belongs to another type of soul, when and how does it acquire them? And if it belongs to the living being, once again, when and how does it do so? We must investigate, then, what it is in us that retains memory, which is what we have been investigating from the outset. If it is the soul which remembers, which faculty or part; and if it is the living being, even as some have thought that that is what sense-perception belongs to, how does it do it, and what must we say the living being is, and also if one must posit that it is the identical thing that apprehends sense-data and thoughts, or a different thing for either one?

§4.3.26. If, then, the living being, the complex of body and soul, is involved in sense-perceptions when actualized, perceiving must be something like – and it is for this reason that it is said to be a common function – drilling a hole or weaving, so that the soul would be involved in sense-perception in the role of craftsman and the body in the role of his instrument, since the body undergoes affections and works for the soul, while the soul receives the impressions made on the body, or that which comes through the body, or the judgement which is made as a result of the body's affection.

So, given the above, sense-perception may actually be termed a common function,¹²¹ but the corresponding memory would not have to belong to the body–soul composite, since the soul has already received the impression and either retained it or abandoned it¹²² – unless one were to take as evidence for remembering being common, too, the fact that we come to be able to remember or tend to forget the memory of the impression as a result of different mixtures in our bodies. But even though the body could be said to be or not to be an impediment, yet remembering might nonetheless belong to the soul. After all, how will it actually be the body–soul composite but not the soul that remembers things that are learnt?

Now, if the living being is a complex in the sense of being something different arising from its two components, in the first place it is absurd to say that the living being is neither body nor soul; for the living being will certainly not be some other thing because the two have changed, nor again because they have been mixed together, so that the soul would be in the living being only potentially.

¹¹⁹ The contrast is between the undescended soul, which is intellect, and the descended soul.

¹²⁰ See Pl., *Tim.* 87E5–6; Ar., *DA* 1.4.408b13–18.

¹²¹ See Pl., *Tht.* 186D2–187A6; Ar., *DA* 1.1.403a3ff.; Alex. Aphr., *De an.* 84.4–9.

¹²² Reading αὐτόν with HS⁴.

Next, even if this is the case, remembering will nonetheless belong to the soul, just as in the mixture of honey and wine, insofar as there is an element that is sweet, that will come from the honey.¹²³

What, then, if the soul itself were to do the remembering, but due to its being in the body, and not being pure, it is as if it had acquired a certain quality, and is able to be marked by the impressions that come from sensibles by having, in a way, a base in the body which enables it to receive them, and not have them as if they were to flow past it?¹²⁴

But, first of all, one would object that the impressions are not things with magnitude, nor are they like sealings, or resistances to pressure, or the making of impressions, because there is no pressing down, not even as in wax, but the way it happens is like intellection, even in the case of sensibles; while in the case of acts of intellection, on the other hand, what could one mean by resistance to pressure? And what need is there of a body or a corporeal quality which goes along with it?¹²⁵

In any case, though, the soul must have memory of its own previous motions, such as the things for which it had an appetite, and what it did not gain the enjoyment of, and how the object of appetite did not reach its body. For how could the body speak of things that did not impinge upon it? Or how will it remember with the aid of the body what the body has no natural capacity for cognizing?

Rather, we should say that some things, which come through the body, come to a stop in the soul, while others pertain to the soul alone, if the soul is to be something, and there is to be a nature and function of soul. And if this is so, there must be desire and a memory of the desire, and, therefore, of attaining or failing to attain its object, since the soul's nature is not among things that are in flux. For if this is not the case, we shall not be able to attribute to it self-awareness or conscious awareness or any power of putting things together or any sort of comprehension. For it is certainly not the case that it has none of these in its own nature and acquires them in the body, but it has certain activities the operation of whose function requires organs; of some it has come bringing the powers, while for others it brings the activations as well. But for the exercise of memory it finds body an impediment; since even now with the addition of certain things there is forgetting, and with their removal and purification from them memory often emerges again. And since memory is permanent, the nature of body, which is mobile and subject to flux, must be the cause of forgetting, not of memory. So, the 'river of

¹²³ See Alex. Aphr., *De an.* 15.5 8.

¹²⁴ Cf. 4.7.1 8³ esp. 6. See *SVF* 1.484 (= Sext. Emp., *M.* 7.228), 2.343 (= Proclus, *In Parm.* 841.2 5 Steel).

¹²⁵ Cf. 4.6.3.38 63.

Lethe¹²⁶ should be understood in this sense. Let this affection, then, belong to the soul.

§4.3.27. But which soul, the one we call the more divine, by which we are who we are, or the other which we have from the world as a whole?¹²⁷

In fact, we should say that there are memories proper to each of the two, some peculiar to each and some common to both.¹²⁸ And when the two souls are together, the memories are all together, but when they become separate, if both were to exist and remain, each would have its own memories for a longer time, but also, for a short period, those of the other. In any case, the shade of Heracles in Hades¹²⁹ – I think we must consider this shade to be us – remembers all the things that were done in his life, because his life belonged predominantly to the shade. But the other souls which became identified with the complex nevertheless had no more to say; it is merely what belonged to this life that these souls knew about, too, other than perhaps something to do with justice. But what Heracles himself, the one separate from the shade, had to say is not mentioned.

What, then, would that other soul say when it has been freed from the body and is on its own? The one which drags along with it anything [corporeal] at all would speak about all the things that the human being did or suffered.¹³⁰ But, after death, with the progress of time, memories of other things would appear from its former lives, and so it would hold some of the memories of the latest life of little value, and dismiss them. When it has been purified of body to a greater extent, it will pass in review even some things which it did not hold in its memory here.¹³¹ And if it comes to be in another body, and departs from it, it will talk about the things of its external life and about the body which it has just let go, and many things belonging to former lives. But in time it will always forget many of the things that have accrued to it.

But what will the soul actually remember when it has come to be on its own?

In fact, first we must investigate to which faculty of the soul the capacity for remembering belongs.

§4.3.28. Is it the one with which we perceive and with which we learn? Or do we remember objects of appetite with the faculty of appetite, and

¹²⁶ See Pl., *Rep.* 621C1 2.

¹²⁷ A distinction between the higher and lower part of the embodied soul. Cf. 2.1.5.18 21; 6.7.5.21 26.

¹²⁸ Cf. *supra* 6.10 25, 9.29 36, 10.20 29, 12.1 2. ¹²⁹ See Homer, *Od.* 11.601 602.

¹³⁰ See Pl., *Phd.* 80E1 81A2. ¹³¹ See Pl., *Phil.* 34B6 C2.

things which caused anger in us with the faculty of spiritedness? For it is not the case, one might say, that one thing will enjoy the perceiving of something, while another will remember the enjoyment of those objects. At any rate, the faculty of appetite will be moved by the things it enjoyed when the object of appetite is seen again, clearly by memory. For why should it not relate to the objects of another faculty, or in a way other than that in which that faculty addresses them? What, then, prevents us from attributing sense-perception of such things as well to the faculty of appetite, and so appetite to the faculty of sense-perception, and all things to all faculties, so that each of them receives its name according to the element predominant in it?

In fact, sense-perception relates to each in a different way; so, for example, sight, not the faculty of appetite, has seen something, but the faculty of appetite is moved by the sense-perception through a kind of transmission, not in such a way that it can announce what kind of sense-perception it has had, but so that it is affected without being consciously aware of it. And again, in the case of anger, sense-perception has seen the man who did the injury, but it is the faculty of spiritedness that bestirs itself, as if, when a shepherd has seen a wolf menacing the flock, his dog, who has not himself seen it with his eyes, were aroused by the smell and the noise. So, let us take the case where the faculty of appetite has enjoyed something, and has a trace of the event deposited in it, not as a memory, but as a disposition or affection; but it is something else that has observed the enjoyment and has retained in itself the memory of what has happened. And evidence of this is the fact that often the memory of things that the faculty of appetite participated in is not pleasant; whereas if it had been in it, it would have been.

§4.3.29. Shall we, then, relocate memory to the faculty of sense-perception, that is, shall we postulate the identity of the faculty of remembering and the faculty of sense-perception? But if the shade is also to have memory, as we were saying,¹³² the faculty of sense-perception will be double, and even if it is not the faculty of sense-perception that remembers, but something else, still what remembers will be double.

Further, if it is the faculty of sense-perception that remembers, that faculty will also handle branches of study and thoughts. But, in fact, a different faculty must deal with each of these. Shall we, then, make the thing that apprehends them common, and attribute memory of both kinds to that? But if what apprehends sensibles and intelligibles were one or identical in both cases, perhaps that would make some sense.¹³³

¹³² Cf. *supra* 27.7 8.

¹³³ This is the view of the Peripatetic Ariston of Ceos, according to Porphyry, fr. 251.

If, however, it is divided into two, there would nonetheless still be two faculties; and if we give both to each of the two souls, there would be four.

15 In general, though, what necessity is there for us to remember with that with which we perceive, and for both to occur by means of the identical power, or for us to remember thoughts with the identical thing with which we think? No, since the identical people are not the best at thinking and at remembering, and those who enjoy a certain level of sense-perception do not remember equally well, and some have a special
20 facility for sense-perception, while others, whose sense-perceptions are not acute, remember well. But again, if each of the two has to be different, and something else will remember things that sense-perception perceived first, must that, too, have perceived what it is going to remember?

In fact, for the person who will remember, there will be nothing to stop the sense-datum from being an imaginative representation, and remembering and retaining the memory will belong to the faculty of
25 imaginative representation, which is a different thing. For this is the point at which the sense-perception terminates, and what was seen is present to it when the sense-perception is no longer there. And if the imagination of what is already absent is in this, it will remember, even if it is present to it for just a short time. But the person to whom it is actually present for a short time will have a brief memory of it, whereas if it is present for a long time people will remember better, with this power
30 being stronger, so that it will not happen that the memory is shaken up and destabilized as a consequence of its being altered.¹³⁴

Memory, then, belongs to the faculty of imaginative representation, and remembering will be of things of this kind. We shall say that people differ in respect of memory either because their powers are in different
35 states, or because they pay attention or do not, or because they possess certain corporeal mixtures or not, and because these alter or do not, and are, in a way, in turmoil. But we can deal with these matters on another occasion.¹³⁵

5 §4.3.30. But what is it that remembers acts of thinking? Does the faculty of imaginative representation remember these, too? If it is the case that a semblance accompanies every act of thinking,¹³⁶ perhaps, if this semblance, which is like an image of the thought, persists, there would in this way be a memory of what has been cognized. If not, we must look to some other solution.

¹³⁴ See Ar., *De mem.* 1.450a12 451a2; Alex. Aphr., *De an.* 68.4 69.2.

¹³⁵ Cf. 4.6.3.

¹³⁶ See Ar., *De mem.* 1.449b30 450a2; *DA* 3.8.432a12 14.

Perhaps, for example, we might postulate the reception into the faculty of imaginative representation of a verbal expression of a thought. For the thought has no parts, and when it has not yet, in a way, proceeded to the outside, it remains unnoticed within, but the verbal expression, by unfolding it and bringing it forth from the thought to the faculty of imaginative representation, exhibits the thought as if in a mirror, and this is how there is apprehension of it, and persistence of it, and memory. For this reason, though the soul is always tending towards intellection, it is when it comes to be at the level of the faculty of imaginative representation that we gain apprehension of this. For intellection is one thing and apprehension of intellection another, and we are always thinking, but do not always apprehend that fact; and this is because that which receives acts of intellection receives not only these, but also sense-perceptions on the lower side.¹³⁷

§4.3.31. But if memory belongs to the faculty of imaginative representation, and we have said that each soul remembers,¹³⁸ there will be two faculties of imaginative representation. Let us grant that, when the souls are apart, they each have one, but when they are in the identical place, in us, how are there two, and in which of them do the memories happen? If in both, there will always be duplicate imaginations; for it would certainly not be the case that the imaginative representation of the one soul would be for intelligibles, while that of the other was for sensibles – that way there would be two living beings having nothing in common with each other.

If, then, both souls have such a faculty, what will be the difference between them? And then, if so, how do we not recognize such a difference?

In fact, when the one soul agrees with the other, and the two faculties of imaginative representation are not separate, and the higher one is dominant, the semblance becomes one, as if a shadow were following the other, or as if a weaker light were being subsumed into a stronger one. But whenever there is conflict and discord, then the other one manifests itself on its own account, while we do not realize that it is in a different faculty. And, in general, the duality of the souls escapes our notice. For the two of them have come to be one thing, and one of them rides dominant over the other.¹³⁹ Now this other one has seen everything, and when it has gone out of the body, it keeps some of the things that pertain to the lower soul, and lets others go. It is as when we have at some time taken up associations with a lower class of person, and then

¹³⁷ Cf. 3.8.6.10 36; 5.1.12.11 21. ¹³⁸ Cf. 4.2.27.3.

¹³⁹ This refers to the entrance of the animal soul over and above the growth soul of the embryo. Cf. *supra* 27.1 6.

20 change these companions for others, we remember a few things to do with the former, but more that pertain to the people who are better.

§4.3.32. But, then, what about memories of one's friends, children or wife? Or of one's country, and such things as it would not be out of place for a cultivated man to remember?

5 In fact, the faculty of imaginative representation remembers each thing with feeling, while the cultivated man would have memories of these in an unaffected way; for one might take it that the feeling is in the former right from the start, and those of the feelings that are respectable are in the virtuous soul, insofar as it has association with the other. It is appropriate, after all, for the inferior soul to aspire to the results of the acts of memory of the other, particularly when it is respectable itself; for a given soul could be better from the beginning, or become better by education received from the superior soul.

10 But in any case this one should be glad to forget the things that come from the inferior; one may after all envisage the possibility that, even when the one soul is virtuous, the other may be worse by its nature, while being forcibly restrained by the other. Indeed, to the extent that it strives upwards, it forgets more things – unless perhaps all its life even in the sensible world was somehow such that it has memories only of better things. In this connection, the remark about 'standing apart from human concerns'¹⁴⁰ is most apt; this necessarily comprises memories, too.

20 So, anyone saying that the good soul is forgetful would be right in this sort of way. For it flees from the many, and brings the many together into one, thus getting rid of unlimitedness.¹⁴¹ In this way, it is not involved with many concerns, but travels light and is focused upon itself; since even in the sensible world, whenever it wants to be in the intelligible world, it gets rid of everything that is other than it while it is still here; and there are few things in the sensible world that are also not in the intelligible world; and when it is in heaven, it will get rid of more. For example, the Heracles we spoke of above¹⁴² would talk about his past brave deeds, but the other Heracles would think these things unimportant, and when he has been transferred to a holier place, and has come to be in the intelligible world, and to a degree surpassing the other Heracles, he prevails in the contests in which the wise contend,¹⁴³ . . .

¹⁴⁰ Pl., *Phdr.* 249C8 D1.

¹⁴¹ See Pl. [?], *Epin.* 991E, 992B.

¹⁴² See *supra.* 27.7ff.

¹⁴³ Porphyry has chosen for some curious reason to divide the treatise in two at this point.